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0.3 Abstract
In the first chapter, I examine the effect of social learning on social norms
of cooperation. To this end I develop an ‘anti-social learning’ game. This is
a dynamic social dilemma in which all agents know how to cooperate but a
proportion are informed and know of privately profitable but socially costly,
or uncooperative, actions. In equilibrium agents are able to infer, or learn,
the payoffs to the actions of prior agents. Agents can then learn through
observation that some socially costly action is privately profitable. This
implies that an informed agent behaving uncooperatively can induce others to
behave uncooperatively when, in the absence of observational learning, they
would have otherwise been cooperative. However, this influence also gives
informed agents an incentive to cooperate – not cooperating may induce
others to not cooperate. I use this model to give conditions under which
social learning propagates cooperative behaviour and conditions under which
social learning propagates uncooperative behaviour.
In the second chapter, I present a co-authored model of a self-fulfilling price
cycle in an asset market. In this model the dividend stream of the economy’s
asset stock is constant yet price oscillates deterministically even though the
underlying environment is stationary. This creates a model in which there
is rational excess volatility - ‘excess’ in the sense that it does not reflect
changes in dividend streams and ‘rational’ in that all agents are acting
on their best information. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by
endogenous variation in the investment horizons of the different market
participants, informed and uninformed.
On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low.
On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets,
knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low.
The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in divi-
dend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings.
Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed
traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is
longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the as-
sets they purchase, not to resell.
On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the
informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the
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market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term.
Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days,
on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell.
Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although
the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets.
On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return:
buying cheap, selling dear. However they don’t have enough cash to strip
the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.
The final chapter is on identifying the role of privilege in determining inter-
generational mobility. The intergenerational elasticity of income is the stan-
dard measurement economists use for intergenerational mobility. It is not
clear how we should interpret intergenerational elasticities. Particularly,
high intergenerational elasticities could either reflect inequality of opportu-
nity or the importance of genetically heritable characteristics in determining
genes. Behavioural geneticists have long been using a twin based variance
decomposition method, the ACE model, to estimate the genetic heritabil-
ity of various characteristics. It is not clear, however, what this approach
implies for intergenerational mobility of equality of opportunity.
I develop a novel method that extends the methodology used in behavioural
genetics to identifying how much of the intergenerational elasticity of in-
come is determined by the presence (absence) of environmental privileges
associated with being children of high (low) earners. Using this approach
we can examine the counterfactuals of giving a poorer child the environment
of a richer child; equalising the privileges associated with family income; and
equalising the family environmental factors not associated with parental in-
come. Furthermore, this method allows us to identify how good parental
income is as a measure of family environment. The model I develop nests
the behavioural genetics model allowing us to relax some of the identifying
assumptions used in the standard ACE model.
Finally, I apply this method to data on the income elasticities between Amer-
ican males of different types of relation: fraternal twins, identical twins and
father-son relationships. The results of this application suggest that a 1
percent increase in the privilege associated with parental income increases
child income by about 1 tenth of a percent. Equalising, to the mean, the
environmental privileges across the population results in about a 30 percent
drop in the intergenerational elasticity of income and a 5 percent drop in
viii
the variance of income across the population. These results must be treated
tentatively as the twin data comes from a separate survey to the data on
intergenerational elasticities.
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Chapter 1
Anti-Social Learning: The Effect of
Social Learning on Cooperation.
James Best
I examine the effect of social learning on social norms of cooperation. To
this end I develop an ‘anti-social learning’ game. This is a dynamic so-
cial dilemma in which all agents know how to cooperate but a proportion
are “informed” and know of privately profitable but socially costly, or un-
cooperative, actions. In equilibrium agents are able to infer, or learn, the
payoffs to the actions of prior agents. Agents can then learn through obser-
vation that some socially costly action is privately profitable. This implies
that an informed agent behaving uncooperatively can induce others to behave
uncooperatively when, in the absence of observational learning, they would
have otherwise been cooperative. However, this influence also gives informed
agents an incentive to cooperate – not cooperating may induce others to not
cooperate. I use this model to give conditions under which social learning
propagates cooperative behaviour and conditions under which social learning
propagates uncooperative behaviour.
1.1 Introduction
The ability of people to learn from the actions of others frequently propagates socially
harmful behaviour. For example, if we see others speeding, shirking at work, or dumping
illegally, we may infer that these activities are not effectively punished and engage in
1
2 CHAPTER 1. ANTI-SOCIAL LEARNING
them ourselves. Such considerations are not entirely new: Mayor Giuliani used such a
‘broken-window’ theory (Kelling and Wilson, 1982) of crime to argue for zero-tolerance
policing in New York. In these cases people assume that others would not be engaged in
these socially harmful activities if they were not privately profitable. Through a similar
process people, or organisations, also learn how to successfully execute particular socially
harmful acts. The criminal methods that criminals learn from one another in prison are
an oft lamented example of this. Indeed it has been famously said that “Prisons are
universities of crime, maintained by the state” (Kropotkin, 1887). An even starker case is
the nuclear weapons programme of the Soviets in the forties and fifties which drew on top
secret research acquired, through espionage, from the US and the UK. Similarly, many of
the new countries to develop nuclear weapons have done so using the research of earlier
nuclear powers.
The purpose of this paper is to clearly illustrate the potential effects of social learning on
norms of cooperative, or uncooperative, behaviour. I develop a simple sequential game
where some informed agents have independently acquired information about the private
profitability of some uncooperative behaviour. In equilibrium, the uncooperative behaviour
of informed agents can reveal the profitability of this behaviour to uninformed agents.
Consequently, uncooperative acts have a bad influence as they teach uninformed agents the
profit in such behaviour, oft resulting in imitation. However, such learning and imitation
implies that the original non-cooperators harm themselves, to some extent, by teaching
others the profit in some socially harmful activity – they become victims of their own bad
influence. If these potential non-cooperators expect to be sufficiently influential they may
cooperate, hiding their socially harmful knowledge, in the hope of reducing the harm they
suffer from the uncooperative behaviour of others.
A perhaps surprising result emerges: social learning can prevent uncooperative behaviour
instead of propagating it. Uncooperative behaviour is prevented when it is unlikely that
any one person will independently learn how to profit through uncooperative behaviour. In
such circumstances the action of an independently informed agent can be very influential;
as other agents will not acquire the information of this agent unless he reveals it through
his action. Therefore these informed agents choose to cooperate instead, so that they
can prevent the socially harmful behaviour from spreading to others. Here, because of its
potential to spread uncooperative behaviour, social learning prevents any uncooperative
behaviour happening in the first place. On the other hand, when independent learning is
likely, those who are independently informed are not very influential and so do not suppress
their uncooperative behaviour. In these cases, the most commonly observed, social learning
propagates uncooperative behaviour.
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An example may make the argument a little clearer. Blast, or dynamite, fishing is a very
effective fishing method. However, blast fishing damages the underlying ecology of the
ecosystem and indiscriminately kills large numbers of fish, many of which go to waste (Fox
and Erdmann, 2000). Due to the socially costly nature of blast fishing it is now illegal in
most countries. However, it was not always illegal, and more importantly, it was not a
technique known amongst all fishermen.
Consider now social learning within two different groups of fishermen who have not yet
discovered, or begun, the practice of blast fishing. The first group fish on Blue Bay. The
second group fish on a large inland lake. These two groups have no direct contact with one
another. Blue Bay is one of many bays along a coastline. Fishermen in one of the other
bays, Red Bay, have discovered and begun the practice of blast fishing. Most of the Blue
Bay fishermen have frequent contact with people from Red Bay. a single lake fisherman
has frequent contact with people from Red Bay.
In each group an individual fisherman discovers blast fishing through his contact with
people from Red Bay. Both fishermen must then decide whether or not to begin blast
fishing. Blast fishing is socially inefficient, so the fishermen would be better off if no one
used blast fishing. If the newly informed fishermen begin blast fishing then they will get
high fish yields in the short run. However, if they adopt blast fishing then their respective
communities will also adopt it, implying lower long run yields. As the other lake fishermen
have little contact with people from Red Bay it is unlikely that they will independently learn
of blast fishing. If the lake fisherman does not use blast fishing then other lake fishermen
will not learn of blast fishing for some time. In contrast, if the bay fisherman does not use
blast fishing he only delays the learning process of the other Blue Bay fishermen by a short
while. This is because the other Blue Bay fishermen are very likely to learn independently
of him; due to their frequent contact with the Red Bay fishermen.
Social learning amongst the lake people causes the lake fisherman to be very influential
as his action determines, for quite some time, whether or not people blast fish on the
lake. On the other hand, social learning gives the Blue Bay fisherman little informational
influence over the people of Blue Bay, because they are so likely to learn independently of
him. Given their relative influences it is clear, in the absence of other considerations such
as community enforcement, that the lake fisherman should not begin blast fishing while
the bay fisherman should. When the probability of independent learning is low then social
learning, amongst the lake fishermen, can prevent blast fishing occurring in the first place;
and when this probability is high then social learning propagates blast fishing, as with the
bay fishermen.
The above example of blast fishing ignores the potential for a group to enforce good be-
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haviour. It may be the case that the bay fisherman does not begin blast fishing because the
fishermen are able to collectively enforce cooperative social norms. Theoretical work on re-
peated games (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006) and community enforcement (Kandori, 1992)
demonstrate that cooperation can be sustained by strategies that punish non-cooperators.
None the less, in contrast to the bay fisherman, the lake fisherman can ensure a cooperative
outcome without needing to worry about such enforcement strategies. This paper exam-
ines only finite games so that such punishment strategies are not credible. This allows us
to abstract away from issues of social enforcement and isolate the effect of social learning
on cooperative behaviour.
Social learning was pioneered in the papers of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al.
(1992). However, they examine the spread of socially useful information where as this
paper examines the spread of socially harmful information and behaviour. Their papers
also examines the potential for inefficient aggregation of information. Such issues are not
examined in this paper as the aim is to examine the effect of social learning on cooperation
and not vice-versa. To this end, those who have information about payoffs in the anti-social
learning model below have perfectly accurate information.
Perhaps the closest work to this paper is the work on leadership pioneered by Hermalin
(1998). Hermalin shows that group contribution to a public good is higher if information
about the value of contribution is restricted to a single known leader acting before all other
members of the group. In order to credibly signal the value of contributing to some group
project the leader contributes more than he would in the perfect information version of the
game. The other members of the group exert the same effort as they would in a perfect
information version of the game.
There are several major differences between this paper and Hermalin (1998). First, Her-
malin (1998) is a signalling model and the anti-social learning model is not. In this paper
informed agents bear the cost of lower private payoffs so they can conceal information;
whereas, in Hermalin’s signalling model the leader bears the cost of higher effort so he
can credibly reveal information. Second, in Hermalin [1998] there is a single leader who
is known to be informed and all other agents are uninformed. The uninformed agents all
act after observing the leader’s action. In this paper, however, there are many potentially
informed agents whose informational status is not known. Last, and most importantly,
the anti-social learning model shows how social learning can prevent or propagate unco-
operative behaviour. Hermalin (1998) does not examine this issue as his paper aims to
explain leadership and not the role of social learning in propagating norms of cooperative
or uncooperative behaviour.
Acemoglu and Jackson (2011) bears some similarities in its research agenda. They show
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that the actions of highly observable individuals may help select the equilibrium of a
repeated game. In this case learning and expectations help leaders select amongst different
equilibria. In the anti-social learning model below, however, people’s actions do not serve
to select one of many possible equilibria. Instead, if there were no uncertainty or learning
in this model then uncooperative behaviour would be the unique dominant strategy. It
is shown that introducing uncertainty and social learning into such a game can remove
uncooperative behaviour as the dominant strategy equilibrium.
The paper proceeds as follows: the basic model is presented in section II and equilibrium
is analyzed in section III. The implications of the equilibrium conditions for the effect of
social learning on cooperation is then discussed in section IV. Section V concludes. All
proofs not in the main body are presented in the appendix.
1.2 Model
There is a finite population N = {1, ...., n}. Agents act sequentially in order of their index
i ∈ N . They choose an action ai ∈ A = {c}
⋃
D. Action c is a singleton and D is a
continuum, D = [0, 1]. There is an element d∗ ∈ D drawn from a uniform distribution,
d∗ ∼ U [0, 1]. Action c is called cooperate; d∗ is called defect ; and any action in D\{d∗} is
called blunder.
Agents have a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(ai,a−i, d
∗), where a−i denotes
the actions of all agents except i and the value of d∗ is the state of the world. Each action
has a private payoff for i, v(ai), that is independent of a−i. Cooperate, c, has a lower
private payoff than defect, d∗, and a higher payoff than blunder. All actions in D have a
negative externality attached to them. X(a−i) is the total cost to i from the externalities
of other agents’ actions; referred to in what follows as “the social harm suffered by i”.




∗) = v(ai)−X(a−i) (1.1)
where
1The results of this paper will be qualitatively similar for more general utility functions where the
privately optimal action is socially inefficient. However, a linear additively separable utility function is
sufficient for demonstrating the importance of social learning for cooperative behaviour.
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v(ai) =

0 if ai = c
v̄ > 0 if ai = d
∗






1 [ai ∈ D] ≥ 0 (1.3)
for a set of actions as.
This game is a social dilemma in the sense that the action with the highest private payoff,
d∗, causes greater social harm than the private benefit of that action:
v̄ < κ(n− 1). (1.4)
That is, all agents defecting is Pareto inferior to all agents cooperating. Note that in the
perfect information variant of this game all agents would defect.
The information structure of this game is as follows. Agents independently learn the value
of d∗ with probability ρ. That is, each agent i receives a signal si ∈ {d∗, ∅} which is i.i.d.
across all agents with a common prior probability of Pr(si = d
∗) = ρ, where ρ ∈ (0, 1). An
agent who independently learns the value of d∗ is referred to as informed ; and an agent
who has not is referred to as uninformed. Agent i observes the actions of all prior agents,
a<i = {a1, ...., ai−1} where a<1 := c.2 Agents do not observe whether other agents are
informed or uninformed. The information set of i, hi, is then the history of actions prior
to i and i’s signal: hi = {a<i, si}.
1.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
Let the dynamic game defined above be called G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1). I use the term equilibrium
to mean a (weak) Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
A pure strategy for player i is a map αi : {A}i−1 × {d∗, ∅} → A where αi(a<i, si) is i’s
action when i observes history a<i = {A}i−1 and has received signal si ∈ {d∗, ∅}.
This paper focuses on symmetric pure strategy equilibria. There is, however, an informal
discussion of non-symmetric equilibria at the end of this section.
2I set a<1 := c rather than ∅ to simplify notation later.
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1.3.1 Symmetric Equilibria
Strategies are symmetric if the actions they imply do not substantively alter when the
elements of [0, 1] are relabelled. This implies that if an informed agent chooses to cooperate
(defect) when nature chooses d∗ = x they should also choose to cooperate (defect) if
d∗ 6= x.
Define a permutation function f(x) to be any function giving a one to one mapping of
the union of {∅} and A into themselves where f(∅) = ∅, f(c) = c and f(x) ∈ D for all x in
D. For any permutation function f(.), let the function F (.) of any vector x = {x1, .., xk}
be defined as F (x) = {f(x1), ...., f(xk)}. If strategies are symmetric an agent playing ai
after observing signal si and history a<i = {a1, ..., ai−1} should play f(ai) after observing
signal f(si) and history f(a1), ..., f(ai−1):
Definition 1.1. A pure strategy profile α is symmetric if and only if
αj [F (a<j), f(sj)] = f [αj(a<j , sj)] (1.5)
for all permutation functions f(.) and all j in all instantiations of the game G (ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1).
Attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria because it seems logical, given the uniformity
of nature’s choice, that agents should not have prior beliefs or strategies conditioned on
particular elements in [0, 1].
The effect of i’s choice on her expected utility can be decomposed into the expected private
payoff to an action and the effect of that action on the social harm that i suffers. For a
history of actions, a<j ; an agent’s signal sj ; and some strategy profile, α; i’s expectation
of the private payoff to some action a is denoted as
E[v(a)|a<i, si;α]. (1.6)
Agents face a tradeoff between the private payoff of an action and that action’s effect on
the behaviour of subsequent agents. An action with a lower expected private payoff, c
for example, may be preferred because it causes fewer agents to defect. An action that
may cause more agents to defect, d∗ for example, may be preferred because it has a higher
private payoff. Agent i can only affect the social harm caused by future agents: X(a>i)




Before proceeding further it is useful to define two particular action profiles. If all agents
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prior to i have cooperated we say a<i = c and if all agents subsequent to i defect we say
a>j = d
∗. Where c = {c, ..., c} and d∗ = {d∗, ..., d∗} are vectors of arbitrary length.
Informed agents acting after histories in which no agent has defected have the largest
potential impact on the number of agents defecting. This is because if an agent defects
on path in a symmetric pure strategy equilibria then all subsequent agents defect. This is
stated formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 1.1. On the path of all symmetric pure strategy equilibria, if ai = d
∗ then
all subsequent agents defect:
ai = d
∗ ⇒ a>i = d∗ = {d∗, ...., d∗}. (1.8)
Proposition 1.1 implies that all agents defect after the very first defection. Hence, we only
need the intuition for the case where i is the first agent to defect. Suppose then that
no agent has yet defected. Clearly all agents know the exact action that i will take if
uninformed.
Definition 1.2. The symmetric pure strategy action of an uninformed agent is aUi :
αi(a<i, ∅) = aUi . (1.9)
Uninformed i does not know the value of d∗ and so an uninformed i does not defect with
probability one. It then follows that i defects only if i is informed and αi(a<i, d
∗) = d∗ is
i’s pure strategy. Hence, if ai = d
∗ then all agents know that i is informed and ai = d
∗
because they can see that ai 6= aUi . A simple backward induction argument then follows:
the last agent, on path, will defect, as will the second to last, and so on back to the first
agent subsequent to i. Once an agent defects in equilibrium then the knowledge of how to
profit from doing bad has been irreversibly revealed and all agents defect.
This leads naturally to the importance of an agent’s ‘influence’. Consider an equilibrium
in which agent i is the first agent to defect. Agent i can pretend to be uninformed and
play the uninformed action instead of defecting. Proposition 1.1 states that all agents
subsequent to i defect if i defects. Hence, pretending to be uninformed implies some
agents, in expectation, do not defect when they would have if i had played her equilibrium
strategy. The number of agents that she prevents from defecting is at least that group
of uninformed agents acting after i but before the next informed agent. This group of
uninformed agents, subsequent to i but prior to the next informed agent, whose behaviour
is so affected by ai, is defined below.
3
3One key difference between the formal definition of an agent’s influence and the common english
meaning of ‘influence’ is that in this paper ‘influence’ refers to a group. Another key difference is that we
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Definition 1.3. The influence of agent i is the set of uninformed agents subsequent to i
but before the next informed agent j′: {i+ 1, ... , j′}. The number of agents in i’s influence
is denoted by Ii.
The expected size of i’s influence, E[Ii], will be critical in determining equilibrium play
and has several important properties. The last agent, n, has no agents in her influence.
The expected size of an agent i’s influence will be determined exactly by the probability
of independent learning, ρ, and the number of agents acting after i, n− i. E[Ii] is mono-
tonically increasing in n − i and decreasing in ρ. Lemma 1.1 below defines E[Ii] for any
given i.
Lemma 1.1. The expected size of i’s influence is
E[Ii] =
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)n+1−i
ρ
. (1.10)
Note that the expected social harm that i suffers if all i’s influence defects is then κE[Ii].
I shall refer to κE[Ii] as “the potential harm of i’s influence”. We can now define a
symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that exists for all instances of the anti-social learning
game above.
Proposition 1.2. For any G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) a symmetric equilibrium exists where:
αj(a<j = c, sj = ∅) = c. (1.11)
αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = c, for κE[Ij ] > v̄. (1.12)
αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = d∗, for κE[Ij ] ≤ v̄. (1.13)
αj(a<j 6= c, sj = d∗) = d∗. (1.14)
αj(a<j 6= c, sj = ∅) = aj∗ , j∗ = max{i < j|ai 6= c} (1.15)
Uninformed j believes v(aj∗) = v̄ if a<j is inconsistent with on path play. Informed j’s
beliefs about the payoffs to actions do not change off path.
On path, uninformed agents cooperate until some agent defects. Informed agent i cooper-
ates if the potential harm of her influence, κE[Ii], is larger than the private payoff from
defecting. The first agent to defect is the first informed agent where the potential harm
of her influence is less than or equal to the private payoff from defecting. It follows imme-
diately from the argument used to demonstrate proposition 1.1 that all agents subsequent
to the first defecting agent then defect.
might argue, in some cases, that the number of agents influenced by an action ai is larger or smaller than
the number of agents in i’s influence.
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On and off path, an uninformed j believes that aj∗ , the most recently played action in
D, has the highest private payoff. The informed always know the value of d∗ and that it
has the highest private payoff. There are two cases where agents are off path but do not
know that they are off path. The first case is where an informed agent h cooperates after a
cooperative history and κE[Ih] < v̄. The game is off path but no subsequent agent realises
it because they do not know that h was informed. Hence, agents can only know that they
are off path if some prior agent has not cooperated.
The second case is where some h such that κE[Ih] < v̄ blunders with ah ∈ D\{d∗}. In this
case informed agents know that they are off path. Uninformed agents, on the other hand,
will not know they are off path unless they are subsequent to some i who plays ai 6= ah.
However, uninformed j still believes that aj∗ has the highest private payoff whether or not
he realises that the game is off path. Consequently, the first agent i to know she is off
path also knows that each subsequent agent will believe, for any action of hers, that some
specific action in D maximises private payoffs.
These beliefs imply that if i knows she is off path then she also knows that all subsequent
agents will play some action in D independently of her own action. To see this, consider
that, as he has no influence, the last agent always maximises private payoffs. Consequently,
he will always play an = d
∗ if informed or an∗ ∈ D if uninformed. Hence, the social harm
that the second to last agent suffers is independent of her own action. It is then optimal
for the second to last agent to maximises her private payoffs by choosing an−1 = d
∗ if
informed or an−1∗ ∈ D if uninformed. Exactly, the same logic then applies to the third to
last agent, and so on, back to the first agent i that realises she is off path. It should be
clear from the above arguments that, on and off path, if an agent doesn’t cooperate after
a cooperative history then all subsequent agents choose some action in D.
The intuition for the strategies of uninformed agents after a cooperative history follows
immediately from the path of play that is implemented by an agent not cooperating. If an
uninformed agent doesn’t cooperate after a cooperative history they get a lower expected
private payoff and, as all subsequent agents then choose an action in D, suffer a higher
expected level of social harm. The same argument holds for an informed agent blundering,
choosing an action in D\{d∗}, after a cooperative history.
If an informed agent i defects, rather than cooperating, after a cooperative history she
increases the number of agents defecting by at least the number of agents in her influence.
If the potential harm of her influence is greater than the private payoff from defecting,
κE[Ii] > v̄, then defecting causes her more expected social harm than she gains from the
higher private payoff. Therefore, cooperating after a cooperative history is optimal when
the potential harm of an informed agent’s influence is larger than the private payoff of
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defecting.
Finally, we consider the optimality of defecting after a cooperative history when an in-
formed agent’s harmful influence is less than or equal to the private payoff from defect,
κE[Ii] ≤ v̄. The strategy of subsequent informed agents is to defect. Cooperating instead
of defecting can then only reduce the number of agents defecting by the number of agents
in i’s influence. Hence, given the strategy of subsequent agents, it is optimal to defect as
the potential harm of i’s influence is less than or equal to the private payoff from defect-
ing. It then remains to be shown that it is optimal for agents subsequent to i to defect if
informed. The last agent always defects if informed and hence agents subsequent to n− 1
defect if informed. Thus, n− 1 defects if informed and κE[In−1] ≤ v̄; so then does n− 2 if
κE[In−2] ≤ v̄; and so on for all informed agents such that κE[Ii] ≤ v̄.
The equilibrium defined in proposition 1.2 is not the only symmetric pure strategy equi-
librium of the game. However, the play implemented by the equilibrium in proposition
1.2, for any particular instance of the anti-social learning game above, is identical for all
symmetric pure strategy equilibria. Theorem 1.1 below characterises on path behaviour
for all such equilibria.
Theorem 1.1. On path play of all i ∈ N , in all symmetric pure strategy equilibria, can be
characterised as follows:
1) For uninformed i:
ai = c if a<i = c, (1.16)
ai = d
∗ if d∗ ∈ a<i. (1.17)
2) For informed i:
ai = c if κE[Ii] > v̄, (1.18)
ai ∈ {c, d∗} if κE[Ii] = v̄. (1.19)
ai = d
∗ if κE[Ii] < v̄. (1.20)
This theorem implies that, on the path of all symmetric pure strategy equilibria, unin-
formed agents cooperate until some agent defects. Informed agent i cooperates if the
potential harm of her influence, κE[Ii], is larger than the private payoff from defecting.
The first agent to defect is the first informed agent where the potential harm of her influ-
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ence is less than or equal to the private payoff from defecting. All agents subsequent to
the first defecting agent defect. This is exactly the same behaviour as on the path of the
equilibrium defined in proposition 1.2.
The intuition for this result is clearest if we just consider the choice between cooperate
and defect. Also, suppose all agents act after a cooperative history or a history in which
some agent has defected.4 Cooperating after a cooperative history maximises uninformed
agents expected private payoffs as they do not know how to defect; hence they cooperate.
After an agent has defected then all agents defect, from proposition 1.1, so uninformed
agents must defect after some other agent has defected.
An informed agent will not defect after a cooperative history if the potential harm of their
influence is larger than the private payoff from defecting. Suppose it were an equilibrium
for an informed agent i to defect after a cooperative history. If that agent pretends to be
uninformed and cooperates then all the agents in her influence cooperate also. This reduces
the social harm that she suffers by at least κE[Ii]. If this is greater than the private payoff
from defect it must then be profitable to deviate and cooperate. Hence, it cannot be an
equilibrium strategy to defect when κE[Ii] > v̄ and so i cooperates when κE[Ii] > v̄.
If κE[Ii] < v̄ and informed agents’ behaviour is as characterised in theorem 1.1 then the
next informed agent and all subsequent agents defect. It then follows from proposition 1.1
that if i defects rather than cooperating she increases the number of agents defecting by
exactly the number of agents in her influence. In which case defecting rather than coop-
erating increases her private payoff by v̄ and the expected social harm that she suffers by
κE[Ii]. Thus, if κE[Ii] < v̄ and all subsequent informed agents defect then i defects.
The last agent always defects if informed. Therefore, it is the case that all agents subsequent
to the second to last agent defect if informed. It then follows that the second to last agent
defects if informed and κE[In−1] < v̄. In which case the third to last agent knows all
subsequent agents defect if informed and chooses to defect if informed; and so on until
an agent i such that κE[Ii] > v̄. This backward induction argument gives the intuition
for agents acting after a cooperative history. For informed agents acting after a non-
cooperative history in which some agent has already defected their behaviour follows from
proposition 1.1. In the case that κE[Ii] = v̄ then i is indifferent between cooperating and
defecting. This concludes the intuition for theorem 1.1.
4It is shown in the formal proof that agents never blunder, choose an action in D\{d∗}, on the path of
a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
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1.3.2 Non-Symmetric Equilibria.
It is worth discussing, informally, the effect of relaxing symmetry. Relaxing symmetry
allows for the existence of a strange set of equilibria where agents are forced by off-path
beliefs to make “sacrificial” blunders in [0, 1].
Consider a game where the potential harm of the first agent’s influence is greater than
κE[I1] > (v̄ − v). In all symmetric equilibria this agent cooperates whether informed or
uninformed. Suppose, however, a case where all uninformed agents believe that the action
0.5 is defect, v(0.5) = v̄, if they are off the equilibrium path. Given these off path beliefs
there is an equilibrium where the first agent always plays 0.5.
Such an equilibrium can have similar play to that in proposition 1.2. The first agent to
defect on path being the first informed agent i such that κE[Ii] ≤ v̄. All agents prior to
the first defecting agent cooperate on path except for the very first agent in the game.
The first agent plays a1 = 0.5. However, off path all uninformed agents play 0.5 and all
informed agents play d∗. The off path play follows from a backward induction argument
and the off path beliefs of uninformed agents; they believe 0.5 maximises private payoffs.
These off path beliefs and strategies imply that if the first agent does not play 0.5 all the
uninformed agents will play 0.5 and all the informed agents will defect. This increases the
expected social harm that the first agent suffers by at least κE[I1] > (v̄ − v). Hence, it is
optimal for the first agent to play 0.5 whether informed or uninformed.5
Note that the first agent playing 0.5 reveals no information about d∗. It is forced by non-
symmetric off-path beliefs about the elements in [0, 1]. It needn’t be the first agent who
has to make the sacrificial blunder either. Any agent i can be forced by these kinds of
non-symmetric off path beliefs to make a sacrificial blunder so long as κE[Ii] > (v̄ − v).
Moreover, it needn’t be just one agent who is forced to make a sacrificial blunder. There can
be equilibria in which all agents for which κE[Ii] > (v̄−v) are forced to make some sacrificial
blunder. Leading to a long line of agents playing 0.5; then agents playing cooperate; then
the first informed agent j∗ such that κE[Ij∗ ] ≤ v̄ defecting; and agents subsequent to j∗
also defecting.
Such equilibria seem quite bizarre. It is not even obvious in what kind of situation we
could even imagine them occurring. The attention of this paper was restricted to sym-
metric equilibria because all actions in D are ex-ante identical. It seemed unrealistic to
suppose that agents should have ex-ante beliefs or strategies regarding particular elements
in D. For example, it is unclear why agents should have any particular belief, ex-ante,
5The claims here should be obvious given the prior analysis in this paper. However, formal proofs are
available from the author on request.
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about the value 0.5 as it is identical, ex-ante, to all other elements in D. That these
strange ‘sacrificial’ equilibria can occur when we move away from symmetry lends further
justification to restricting beliefs and strategies so that they treat all elements in D as
ex-ante identical.
1.4 The Effect of Social Learning on Cooperation
The probability of an individual being informed is the critical factor in determining whether
social learning propagates or prevents uncooperative behaviour. If agents are unlikely to be
informed then the informed agents expect to influence a large number of other actors. This
causes the informed agents to internalise the social cost of their actions to a large extent and
choose the socially optimal action. In which case social learning prevents uncooperative
behaviour. Here, the possibility of social learning prevents anti-social behaviour and the
possibility of anti-social behaviour prevents social learning.
An informed agent expects to have a less significant influence on the actions of others when
others are more likely to be informed. If this influence is sufficiently small then all the
informed agents choose to defect. This causes all the uninformed agents to defect also. In
this case social learning propagates anti-social behaviour through the bad influence of the
informed on the uninformed.
The effect of social learning on cooperation can be examined by comparing the behaviour in
the dynamic gameG(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1), above, to an equivalent static game S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1).
In the static game there is no social learning as agents do not observe the actions of other
agents. The static game S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all
informed agents play d∗ and all uninformed agents cooperate. In expectation the propor-
tion of agents who defect in the static game S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) is ρ.
Theorem 1.2 below states that no informed agent cooperates in the dynamic gameG(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1)
if ρ is sufficiently high relative to a ratio of the social harm of defecting and the private
payoff of d∗.
Theorem 1.2. In any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium the first informed agent and
all subsequent agents defect if:
ρ ≥ ρ̄ = κ
κ+ v̄
. (1.21)
Proof: From theorem 1.1 informed agent i and all subsequent agents defect in a symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium if v̄ > κE[Ii]. It can be shown that if ρ > ρ̄ then v̄ > κE[Ii] for
all agents in any finite population.
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The expected influence of i is
E[Ii] =





for all i ≥ 1 and all n ∈ N.
If ρ ≥ ρ̄ then




v̄ > κE[Ii] for all i ≥ 1 and all n ∈ N.

It follows immediately from theorem 1.2 that social learning increases the number of agents
who defect when ρ and n are sufficiently large. Hence, corollary 1.3 below gives suf-
ficient conditions under which social learning causes a deterioration in cooperative be-
haviour.
Corollary 1.3. The expected number of agents defecting in any symmetric pure strat-
egy equilibrium of the dynamic game G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) is greater than in the static game
S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) if ρ ≥ ρ̄ and n >
1
ρ
Proof: In G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1), for ρ ≥ ρ̄, the expected number of agents cooperating in the









The expected number of agents defecting in S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) is ρn. Therefore, the ex-
pected number of agents defecting in the dynamic game less the expected number of agents
defecting in the static game is
n− 1− ρ
ρ
− ρn = (1− ρ)n− 1− ρ
ρ
. (1.24)
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
Theorem 1.4 below states that the population is almost entirely cooperative for very large
populations when ρ < ρ̄.
Theorem 1.4. In any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the game G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1)
with ρ < ρ̄ the proportion of agents cooperating tends to one as the population size tends
to infinity.
Proof:
Take a fixed set of parameters ρ, κ and v̄ such that ρ < ρ̄. The expected harm from the
first agent’s influence choosing d∗ is
κE[I1] = κ
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)n
ρ
. (1.26)





as n tends to infinity. Therefore, there exists some finite n = n such that κE[I1] > v̄ and
κE[Ii] < v̄ for all i > 1. n is any n that satisfies
κ
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)n
ρ
> v̄ > κ
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)n−1
ρ
. (1.27)
Suppose a population n′ > n. It follows that the expected social harm from i’s influence
playing d∗ is greater than v̄ if and only if there are fewer than n−1 agents acting subsequent
to i. That is
κE[Ii] = κ
(1− ρ)− (1− ρ)n′+1−i
ρ
< v̄ if and only if n′ − i < n− 1. (1.28)
Hence, the number of agents that defect in an informative equilibrium where ρ < ρ̄ is
bounded above by the finite integer n−1. The proportion of agents cooperating for n′ > n
is then bounded below by
n′ + 1− n
n′
which tends to one as n′ tends to infinity.

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From theorem 1.4 it can easily be shown that social learning decreases the number of agents
who defect when ρ < ρ̄ and n is sufficiently large.
Corollary 1.5. There always exists a finite n̄ such that the expected number of agents de-
fecting in any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the dynamic game G(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1)
is less than in the static game S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) if ρ < ρ̄ and n > n̄.
Proof: In the static game S(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1) the expected number of agents defecting is ρn.
From theorem 1.4 the proportion of agents defecting in the dynamic gameG(ρ;n, {U(.)}ni=1)
tends to zero as n tends to infinity. Therefore, there exists some finite n̄ such that if n > n̄
the expected number of agents defecting is less than ρn > 0.

In this section it has been shown that when the probability of being informed is greater than
ρ̄ that social learning propagates uncooperative behaviour through the bad influence of the
informed on the uninformed. However, when ρ < ρ̄, and the population is large, then social
learning prevents uncooperative behaviour by causing the informed to internalise the social
cost of their actions due to their potential bad influence on the uninformed. Consequently,
social learning can reduce uncooperative behaviour in populations when the probability of
independent learning is low.
1.5 Conclusion
The anti-social learning game in this paper provides an insight into the potential impor-
tance of social learning for norms of cooperation. This insight is that the probability of
independent learning can determine whether social learning propagates uncooperative be-
haviour or prevents it. When people are likely to learn in an independent fashion then
social learning tends to propagate uncooperative behaviour. When people are unlikely
to learn in an independent fashion then social learning can prevent people from being
uncooperative.
It is easy to observe cases when uncooperative behaviour is propagated via social learning.
It is, however, quite difficult to observe cases where the possibility of social learning pre-
vents uncooperative behaviour. To see that uncooperative behaviour is being prevented we
would need to know that the socially harmful activity exists; that it is privately profitable
for some agents; and that some of the economic actors have this information too.
To illustrate this point, consider the lake fishermen discussed in the introduction. Recall
that there was one lake fisherman with knowledge of blast fishing. This fisherman did
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not adopt the practice because he did not want other fishermen on his lake to adopt the
practice. None of the other lake fishermen knew about blast fishing and would not have
realised that the potential for social learning had prevented some fisherman from adopting
this harmful practice.
In many cases we are like these uninformed lake fishermen. We do not know an uncoop-
erative activity is not happening because we do not know such an activity is possible, or
profitable. In other cases we may be aware of a profitable uncooperative activity but not
know that the relevant actors have this information. For example, we might know of blast
fishing but not know that some of the lake fishermen know of blast fishing. In which case
the absence of blast fishing may only indicate that no fisherman on the lake is aware of
blast fishing.
We then only see that the potential for social learning prevents informed fishermen from
practising blast fishing when we both know about the practice of blast fishing and that
some fishermen know of the practice. In general we can only have concrete evidence for
this preventative role of social learning when we are privy to both the information of the
‘informed’ agents and we know that some agents are informed. It may well be difficult
for economists to acquire such information while the uncooperative behaviour is still being
repressed.
It may, however, be fruitful to examine cases where a new form of uncooperative behaviour
has taken off. It would be partial evidence for the suppression of uncooperative behaviour
if a surge in new forms of uncooperative behaviour had been preceded by large increases in
the proportion of people, or organisations, which we would characterise as having a high
probability of independent learning. This might be an increase in the proportion of people
who are intelligent; possess expertise; or are well connected outside the group. In the case
where organisations are the unit of analysis this might be an increase in the proportion
of organisations which have high expenditure on research and development or strategic
analysis.
An important implication then of this model is that organisations may want to restrict
the proportion of people who are intelligent; innovative; or have special expertise. This is
a possible factor contributing to a desire of firms to not employ ‘over-qualified’ workers.
Organisations or groups may also like to make experimentation highly costly in order to
stop people from independently discovering socially harmful activities. This might be a
contributing factor for the many taboos and high demands for conformity demonstrated in
many tribal societies. In the same vein this may help explain why some groups or societies
choose to be insular, so they can stop their members from learning harmful practices from
outsiders.
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Another implication of this model is that it is not necessarily a good idea to isolate people
with ‘bad behaviour’ from people with ‘good behaviour’. The fear is that those with bad
behaviour will be a bad influence on those with good behaviour. However, by putting
the badly behaved in with the well behaved we increase the number of people who can
be influenced by an individuals bad behaviour. If the numbers of the badly behaved are
sufficiently small relative to the well behaved then the model in this paper predicts that
they will suppress their own bad behaviour. Their new found influence, or responsibility,
causes them to internalise the social cost of their actions and turn over a new leaf.
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Appendix
PROOF of Lemma 1.1:
The probability of there being exactly j ≤ n − i agents in i’s influence is the probability
of there being at least j less the probability of there being at least j + 1:
(1− ρ)j − (1− ρ)j+1.




j[(1− ρ)j − (1− ρ)j+1], (1.29)









PROOF of Proposition 1.1:
(i) If ai = d
∗ on path in a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium then it is common knowledge
for all j ≥ i that ai = d∗ with probability one.
All informed agents know d∗ and so we only need consider whether uninformed agents can
infer that ai = d
∗. Uninformed j observes ai ∈ D and not the informational status of i, si.
Let aUj = αi(a<i, ∅) and aIi = αi(a<i, d∗) be the on path actions of an uninformed i and
an informed i respectively.
Consider first the case where d∗ /∈ a<i and aIi = d∗. In this case aUi 6= aIi with probability
1 as an uninformed i does not know the value of d∗ and aUi could then only equal d
∗ by
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Therefore, if ai 6= aUi then all j > i know that i is informed and that ai = d∗.
This proves (i) for the case where d∗ /∈ a<i and aIi = d∗. The case where d∗ /∈ a<i and
aUi = d
∗ is a zero probability event. For the case where d∗ ∈ a<i let h < i be the first
agent to defect, ah = d
∗. From the above analysis it is common knowledge that ah = d
∗.
ai = d
∗ only if ai = ah and hence it is common knowledge amongst all j > i that ai = d
∗.
This concludes the proof of (i).
(ii) If it is common knowledge for all j > i on path that ai = d
∗ then all subsequent agents
defect on path.
Let it be common knowledge that ai = d
∗. Suppose α(a<k, sk) = d
∗ for all k > j > i and
aj 6= d∗ on path. j knows that ai = d∗ whether j is informed or uninformed. If j deviates
and plays aj = d
∗ then j has a higher private payoff and cannot increase the social harm
that she suffers. aj = d
∗ would then be a profitable deviation. Therefore it cannot be the
case that α(a<k, sk) = d
∗ for all k > j > i and aj 6= d∗ on path. It follows that,
α(a<k, sk) = d
∗ on path ∀k > j ⇒ aj = d∗ on path, (1.31)
and thus
α(a<k, sk) = d
∗ on path ∀k > j ⇒ α(a<k, sk) = d∗ on path ∀k > j − 1. (1.32)
in all equilibria where it is common knowledge that ai = d
∗.
The last agent, n, maximises private payoffs and so
α(a<n, sn) = d
∗ if n > i. (1.33)
Given (1.33) we can iteratively apply (1.32) to get (ii) by backwards induction.
Proposition 1.1 then follows immediately from (i) and (ii). 
PROOF of Proposition 1.2:
First it is shown that the two sub-strategies that define the response to noncooperative
histories, (1.14) and (1.15), are both optimal on and off the equilibrium path. Sub-strategy
(1.14), αj(a<j 6= c, sj = d∗) = d∗, defines the behaviour of informed agents. Sub-strategy
(1.15), αj(a<j 6= c, sj = ∅) = aj∗ where j∗ = max{i < j|ai 6= c}, defines the behaviour of
uninformed agents.
Consider an agent acting after a noncooperative history where all subsequent agents will
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choose some action in D after any noncooperative history. It then follows that this agent
cannot affect the externalities generated by subsequent agents:
[a<j 6= c and αk(a<k 6= c, sk) ∈ D ∀k > j]⇒ X(a>j) ⊥ aj . (1.34)
If an agent’s action does not affect the externalities generated by subsequent agents then
the agent maximises expected private payoff:
X(a>j) ⊥ aj ⇒ argmax
aj
E[v(aj)|a<j, sj ;α] = argmax
a
E[U(aj ,a−j , d
∗)|a<j, sj ;α]. (1.35)
Given equilibrium behaviour and off path beliefs, after some i < j has played ai ∈ D
uninformed agent j believes aj∗ maximises private payoffs. An informed agent knows the
value of d∗, on and off path, and that it maximises private payoffs. Therefore, an action in




E[v(aj)|a<j 6= c, sj ;α] ∈ {an∗ , d∗} ∈ D. (1.36)
It then follows immediately from (1.34), (1.35) and (1.36) that j plays an action in D after
a noncooperative history if all subsequent agents have a strategy of choosing some action
in D after any noncooperative history:
αk(a<k 6= c, sk) ∈ D ∀k > j ⇒ αk(a<k 6= c, sk) ∈ D ∀k > j − 1 (1.37)
The last agent, n, cannot affect the social harm generated by others. Hence, n maximises
expected private payoff:
αn(a<n 6= c, sn) ∈ {an∗ , d∗} ∈ D. (1.38)
Consequently,
αk(a<k 6= c, sk) ∈ D ∀k > n− 1. (1.39)
Given (1.39) we can iteratively apply (1.37) to demonstrate the optimality of sub-strategies
(1.14) and (1.15) by backwards induction.
Next we examine the sub-strategies that define the response to cooperative histories, (1.11),
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(1.12) and (1.13). Agent j always believes she is on the equilibrium path if a<j = c.
Therefore, we only need to prove that (1.11), (1.12) and (1.13) are optimal for agent j who
believes she is on path.
It has just been shown that if ai ∈ D then aj ∈ D for all j > i, on and off the equilibrium
path. Hence, agent i plays ai ∈ D only if ai maximises i’s expected private payoff. That
is
[a<i = c and ai ∈ D]⇒ ai = argmax
a
E[v(a)|a<i, si;α]. (1.40)
Defecting does not maximises expected private payoff for uninformed i if a<i = c. So
it follows from (1.40) that the strategy defined in (1.11), αj(a<j = c, sj = ∅) = c, is
optimal.
Next, we examine the optimality of sub-strategies (1.12), αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = c if
κE[Ij ] > v̄; and (1.13), αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = d∗ if κE[Ij ] < v̄. From (1.40), if a<j = c
then aj /∈ D\{d} as aj ∈ D\{d} does not maximises expected private payoffs. Hence, we




∗)− U(aj = c,a−j , d∗)|a<j, sj = d∗;α]. (1.41)
If expression (1.41) is less than zero when κE[Ij ] > v̄ then sub-strategy (1.12) is optimal.
Likewise, sub-strategy (1.13) is optimal if expression (1.41) is greater than or equal to zero
when κE[Ij ] ≤ v̄.
From the strategies defined in (1.15) and (1.11) it follows that all j’s influence plays d∗ if
aj = d
∗ and all j’s influence play c if aj = c when a<j = c . This implies the expected social
harm suffered by j is greater by at least κE[Ij ] for aj = d
∗ than for aj = c. Therefore,
aj = c is optimal if κE[Ij ] > v(d
∗) − v(c) = v̄; proving the optimality of sub-strategy
(1.12).
If the strategy of agents subsequent to j is αk(a<k = c, sk = d
∗) = d∗ for all k > j then
the expected social harm suffered by j is greater by exactly κE[Ij ] for aj = d
∗ than for
aj = c. Hence
[κE[Ij ] > v̄ and αk(a<k = c, sk = d
∗) = d∗, ∀k > j]⇒ αj(a<j = c, sj = d∗) = d∗. (1.42)
The last agent maximises expected private payoffs so αn(a<n = c, sn = d
∗) = d∗. Which
implies that αk(a<k = c, sk = d
∗) = d∗ for all k > j = n − 1. By backwards induction
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αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = d∗ is optimal for all j such that κE[Ij ] ≤ v(d∗)− v(c) = v̄; proving
the optimality of sub-strategy (1.13).
Finally, we prove symmetry. We can write sub-strategy (1.15) as αj(a<j 6= c, sj = ∅) =
max{ai ∈ a<j |ai 6= c} and we immediately see that (1.15) satisfies symmetry from the
fact that f(max{ai ∈ a<j |ai 6= c}) = max{ai ∈ F (a<j)|ai 6= c} for all permutation
functions f . We can write sub-strategy (1.14) as αj(a<j 6= c, sj = d∗) = sj . Hence,
αj(F (a<j) 6= c, f(sj = d∗)) = f(sj) = f(αj(a<j 6= c, sj = d∗). We can write sub-strategy
(1.13) as αj(a<j = c, sj = d
∗) = sj when κE[Ij ] < v̄ and then show symmetry by the
same argument as for sub-strategy (1.14). The symmetry of (1.11) and (1.12) follows
immediately from the fact that f(c) = c.

PROOF of Theorem 1.1:
First, it is shown that there is no history a<i on path where d
∗ /∈ a<i and a<i 6= c. This
holds if no i plays ai = x ∈ D\{d∗} after a cooperative history. For uninformed i, if
αi(c, ∅) = x 6= c then αi(F (c), f(∅)) = αi(c, ∅) = x 6= f(αi(c, ∅)) for some permutation
function f(.). For informed i, suppose a permutation function such that f(d∗) = d∗
and f(x) 6= x. It is then obvious that the strategy αi(c, d∗) = x is not symmetric as
αi(F (c), f(d
∗)) = αi(c, d
∗) = x 6= f(x). Hence, agents only act after cooperative histories
or histories containing d∗, i.e. on path it is the case that d∗ ∈ a<i or that a<i = c.
The behaviour of uninformed agent i after a cooperative history must be c to satisfy
symmetry, as shown above. It follows from proposition 1.1 that uninformed agent i plays
ai = d
∗ if d∗ ∈ a<i. This proves that uninformed agents on path behaviour is fully
characterised by theorem 1.1.
Next, we see that on path behaviour of informed agent i can be completely characterised
by κE[Ii] relative to v̄. We begin with the behaviour of informed agents acting after
cooperative histories. After a cooperative history, as shown above, an informed agent
plays ai ∈ {c, d∗}.
If αi(c, d
∗) = d∗ and i deviates by playing cooperate then no subsequent agent realises
that they are off path and, given uninformed on path play, all agents in i’s influence will
cooperate. If i does defect then, from proposition 1.1, we know that all subsequent agents
defect. Thus, by cooperating i reduces the expected social harm that i suffers by at least
κE[Ii] and reduces private payoffs by v̄. Therefore, ai = c for all informed i on path after
a cooperative history if κE[Ii] > v̄.
This implies that all agents for which κE[Ii] ≥ v̄ act after a cooperative history. Thus, the
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behaviour in (1.18) fully characterises the on path behaviour of informed agents for which
κE[Ii] > v̄. It also follows immediately that the behaviour in (1.19) fully characterises the
on path behaviour of informed agents for which κE[Ii] = v̄ as informed i plays ai ∈ {c, d∗}
after a cooperative history.
Consider now an informed agent i where κE[Ii] < v̄ and a<i = c. Suppose all subsequent
informed agents have the following strategy:
αi(c, d
∗) = d∗ ∀j > i. (1.43)
The first informed agent after i (after i’s influence) plays d∗ and so then do all subsequent
agents. If ai = d
∗ then the worst outcome is if all subsequent agents defect. If ai = c
(which is consistent with on path play as others do not observe if i is informed) then the
best outcome for i, given the strategy of subsequent informed agents, is that i’s influence
cooperates and then all subsequent agents defect. This implies that playing ai = d
∗
increases the expected social harm that i suffers by κE[Ii] at most. This is more than
compensated for by the increase in the private payoff of i as κE[Ii] < v̄. Therefore, ai = d
∗
for informed i on path after a cooperative history where subsequent informed agents have
the strategy defined in (1.43). Which implies the following for i such that κE[Ii] < v̄:
αi(c, d
∗) = d∗ ∀j > i⇒ αi(c, d∗) = d∗ ∀j > i− 1. (1.44)
The last agent n maximises private payoffs and so αn(c, d
∗) = d∗. Iteratively applying
(1.44) implies that αi(c, d
∗) = d∗ for all informed i such that κE[Ii] < v̄. From proposition
1.1 we know that all informed i play d∗ on path if d∗ ∈ a<i. As there is no history where
a<i 6= c and d∗ /∈ a<i this implies that (1.20) fully characterises the on path behaviour for
informed i such that κE[Ii] > v̄.

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Chapter 2
Self-Fulfilling Price Cycles
James Best and John Moore
This chapter presents a model of a self-fulfilling price cycle in an asset
market. In this model the dividend stream of the economy’s asset stock is
constant yet price oscillates deterministically even though the underlying
environment is stationary. This creates a model in which there is ratio-
nal excess volatility - ‘excess’ in the sense that it does not reflect changes
in dividend streams and ‘rational’ in that all agents are acting on their
best information. The mechanism that we uncover is driven by endogenous
variation in the investment horizons of the different market participants,
informed and uninformed.
On even days, the price is high; on odd days it is low.
On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets,
knowing that they can buy them back the next day, when the price is low.
The anticipated drop in price more than offsets any potential loss in divi-
dend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build up their cash holdings.
Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the uninformed
traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is
longer than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the as-
sets they purchase, not to resell.
On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the
informed are using their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the
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market. Now the uninformed, like the informed, are investing short-term.
Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets purchased on even days,
on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell.
Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although
the informed are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets.
On each cherry that they pick out of the market, they earn a high return:
buying cheap, selling dear. However they don’t have enough cash to strip
the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.
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2.1 Introduction
Shiller (1980) argues that the volatility in asset prices is not justified by subsequent changes
in dividend streams. Nor, he argues, are they justified by changes in public information
about fundamentals (Shiller, 1992). Such excess volatility is prima facie evidence that mar-
ket participants are behaving irrationally. We ask if it is possible that such excess volatility
be generated by purely rational market participants. Moreover, can it be explained from
within the model – that is to say, endogenously, without exogenous variation?
It is known that bubbles can be part of a stochastic equilibrium (Abreu and Brunnermeier,
2003). In this paper we set ourselves the challenge of generating deterministic price move-
ment in a perfectly stationary environment where asset prices reflect all publicly available
information. In this economy the dividend stream of the asset stock would be constant
while the asset prices would be volatile - a most extreme form of excess volatility. We show
that it is possible.
In our model the dynamic interaction of adverse selection (we have informed and unin-
formed traders) and credit constraints (the informed traders do not have deep pockets)
can endogenously generate variation in the investment horizons of the different market
participants. With these simple ingredients, we demonstrate a saw-tooth equilibrium in
which prices deterministically rise one day and fall the next, ad infinitum. On even days,
the price is high; on odd days it is low.
On even days, informed traders are willing to jettison their good assets, knowing that they
can buy them back the next day, when the price is low. The anticipated drop in price more
than offsets any potential loss in dividend. Because of these asset sales, the informed build
up their cash holdings. Understanding that the market is flooded with good assets, the
uninformed traders are willing to pay a high price. But their investment horizon is longer
than that of the informed traders: their intention is to hold the assets they purchase, not
to resell.
On odd days, the price is low because the uninformed recognise that the informed are using
their cash holdings to cherry-pick good assets from the market. Now the uninformed, like
the informed, are investing short-term. Rather than buy-and-hold as they do with assets
purchased on even days, on odd days the uninformed are buying to sell.
Notice that, at the root of the model, there lies a credit constraint. Although the informed
are flush with cash on odd days, they are not deep pockets. On each cherry that they pick
out of the market, they earn a high return: buying cheap, selling dear. However they don’t
have enough cash to strip the market of cherries and thereby bid the price up.
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This paper sits within the literature on adverse selection that started with Akerlof (1970).
Our model is an infinite horizon adverse selection model. For earlier examples of such
models one can see Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) and Hendel et al. (2005) on dynamic adverse
selection in the context of durable goods markets. These papers, as opposed to ours, do
not look to examine or generate price volatility through this mechanism.
Dow (2004) develops an adverse selection model that examines the potential for self-
fulfilling liquidity. In this paper there are two equilibria: a high liquidity equilibrium
with narrow bid-ask spreads and a low proportion of trade being informational; and a
low liquidity equilibrium with wide bid-ask spreads and a high proportion of trade being
informational. Unlike the model in Dow (2004) we examine prices, as opposed to liquidity.
We also examine adverse selection in a dynamic (infinite-horizon) setting as opposed to a
one shot game. As a result the meaning of ‘self-fulfilling’ in the two papers is different.
In Dow (2004) liquidity is self-fulfilling in the multiple equilibrium sense. There are two
possible levels of liquidity and either level, high or low, justifies the equilibrium behaviour
that justifies the level of liquidity. In our paper the price cycle is not self-fulfilling in the
multiple equilibrium sense but in the sense that future prices justify the present price and
the present price justifies future prices.
Eisfeldt (2004) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2013) use adverse selection to model liquidity
in a dynamic infinite horizon setting. Aggregate dynamics within their models result from
aggregate shocks. A key difference, then, between these papers and our own is that the
aggregate dynamics in our model arise completely endogenously, in a perfectly stationary
environment.
In Section II, we introduce the formal model. In Section III, we examine a constant price
equilibrium. In section IV, we construct a self-fulfilling price cycle equilibrium. In section
V, we provide a numerical example.
2.2 Model
The economy is discrete time, with a durable generic consumption good, fruit, and a
single kind of asset, trees. At the start of each day trees mature with probability µ. The
maturation process is i.i.d. across trees, age and time. When trees mature they bear fruit
and immediately die. Trees that do not mature do not bear fruit and do not die.
There are two types of tree: high quality “cherry” trees and low quality “lemon” trees. A
fraction γ of trees are cherry. When trees mature, lemon trees bear l > 0 (generic) fruit
and cherry trees bear h = l + ∆ (generic) fruit, where ∆ > 0.
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There is a continuum of risk-neutral traders. At the end of each day traders die with
probability δ. Agents learn earlier in the day, after trees have matured, if they are to die
at the end of the day. Death is i.i.d. across traders, age and time. Traders consume fruit,
only once, just before they die.
There are two types of trader: “informed” traders and “uninformed” traders. Informed
traders can determine whether an unmatured tree is a cherry or a lemon; uninformed
traders cannot. A fraction θ of traders are informed.
Each day – after the maturation of a fraction µ of the existing trees, but before a fraction
δ of traders learn if they will die at the end of the day – a mass α of new traders are
born endowed with a mass τ of new, unmatured, trees. A fraction γ of these new trees
are cherry and a fraction θ of these new traders are informed. The overnight steady-state
stock T of trees (of which γT are cherry) solves µT = τ . And the overnight steady-state
mass A of traders (of whom θA are informed) solves δA = α.
There is a daily competitive spot market in which trees are traded for fruit. The market
occurs after traders learn if they will die at the end of the day. That is, the timing on each
day is as follows:
1. A fraction µ of the existing trees mature: they yield fruit and die.
2. A mass α of new traders (of whom a fraction θ are informed) are born endowed with
a mass τ of new, unmatured, trees (of which a fraction γ are cherry).
3. A fraction δ of traders – including a fraction δ of the newly-born1 – learn that they
are dying today (see 5 below).
4. A market occurs in which trees are traded for fruit.
5. The dying traders consume their fruit and die.
We can save on notation by assuming τ = µ and α = δ, so that T = 1 and A = 1.
This model typically has several equilibria. Given the stationary nature of the environment,
it is unsurprising that there is an equilibrium where price is constant through time; see
section 2 below.
We do not try to characterise all the non-constant-price equilibria. However, of particular
interest to us is an equilibrium where the price deterministically oscillates: a high price
on (e.g.) even days and a low price on odd days. We analyse this “saw-tooth” equilib-
rium in section 4. It is to this surprising equilibrium that we wish to draw the reader’s
attention.
1These traders live short lives.
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There are features that are common to all the equilibria we study – i.e., common to a
constant-price equilibrium and a saw-tooth equilibrium. Crucially, we assume that in-
formed traders are able to cherry pick in the market – they only purchase cherry trees, to
the extent that their budgets allow. Uninformed traders purchase the residual supply of
trees. Of the trees purchased by the uninformed on day t, let qt be the equilibrium fraction
that are cherry.
The market price pt will reflect the uninformed buyers’ (rational) beliefs about qt. That
is, pt is determined by an indifference condition for an uninformed buyer: between holding
pt fruit and purchasing a tree of “quality” qt. In all the equilibria we examine in sections 3
and 4, we assume that the parameters are such that the informed buyers as a whole cannot
afford to purchase all the cherry trees being supplied to the market, so qt > 0.
Two behaviour patterns are obvious. First, a dying trader sells all his trees so as to
maximise his fruit consumption before he dies. Second, on the day she is born, an informed
trader sells all her endowment of lemon trees: if she uses the proceeds to purchase cherry
trees then she is in effect using the market to replace lemon with cherry. (To simplify our
diagrams, as an accounting convention we assume that informed new-borns always first
replace lemon with cherry, even if they have discovered they are going to die later that day
and so will immediately resell these cherry trees.)
Finally, we make five assumptions on parameters the reasons for which will not be apparent
to the reader until later in the paper:
Assumption 1:
0 > a0 ≡θµ
{
l(1− γ)(1− δ)δ + l(1− δ)2µ+ ∆γ(1− δ)2µ
}





− θ > 0 (2.2)
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Assumption 3:
0 > ã0 ≡ θµ(1− δ)2
{



































δ2(2− δ)(l + ∆)−
δ(1− γ)∆[1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)]
[
1− (1− µ)2(1− δ)2
]
1− δ)(1− µ)(2− µ)
}
(2.5)
An analytical proof that parameters consistent with these assumptions exist is left to the
appendix.
2.3 Constant Price Equilibrium
In this equilibrium the price and market quality of trees is constant: pt = p
∗ and qt = q
∗ for
all t. Dying traders sell all their trees; new born informed traders switch any lemon trees
they carry for cherry (as described in section 2 above) – no other trees are sold. Informed
traders exchange all their fruit for cherry trees sold by the dying traders. Uninformed
traders purchase the residual stock of trees sold by the dying and the lemons sold by the
new-born informed traders. q∗ is the proportion of trees bought by the uninformed that
are cherry.
2.3.1 Incentive Compatibility and Price
The informed and uninformed equilibrium behaviour follows from the fact that p∗ is the
value of a market tree to an uninformed trader. The supply of market trees – the residual
trees sold after cherry picking by the informed – is positive. Therefore, from the indifference
of the uninformed between market trees and p∗ fruit, the net purchase of market quality
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trees by the uninformed is strictly positive i.e., the uninformed do not sell their market
quality trees.
Neither do the uninformed sell trees with which they are born as these trees are strictly
preferred to p∗ fruit. To see this we first derive p∗ from its equivalence with an uninformed
trader’s valuation of a market quality tree:
p∗ = µ(l + q∗∆) + (1− µ)p∗
= l + q∗∆. (2.6)
Where (l+ q∗∆) is the expected yield if the tree matures and p∗ is the value of the tree if
it does not mature.
A proportion γ of trees with which traders are born are cherry – a strictly greater proportion
of cherry than for market trees. If a trader holds a tree with which they are born it can be
sold for a price p∗ if it does not mature. The value of such a tree is then bounded below
by
µ(l + γ∆) + (1− µ)p∗,
which is strictly greater than p∗ as defined in equation (2.6). Therefore uninformed traders
strictly prefer the trees with which they are born to p∗ fruit. The above argument holds
a fortiori for cherry trees, i.e. informed traders strictly prefer cherry trees to p∗ fruit.
Therefore informed traders exchange all their fruit for cherry trees and never sell cherry
trees if they are not dying that day.
2.3.2 Market Clearing
As the informed traders hold only cherry trees overnight – call this stock N – the unin-
formed must hold the entire overnight stock of fruit in the economy – call this stock Y . At
the equilibrium steady state of Y , Y ∗, the total fruit consumed per day equals total fruit
produced per day.
The equilibrium steady state of N , N∗, is where the outflow of cherry trees from informed
traders’ overnight stock is equal to the inflow. Of the (1 − δ)N∗ trees held by the non-
dying, a fraction µ are lost to maturation. δ of the N∗ cherry trees are sold each period
by the dying. The maturing cherry trees held by the non-dying informed traders yield
(1 − δ)µN∗(l + ∆) fruit – this fruit is then exchanged for cherry trees. The non-dying
new-born informed traders replace their lemons with cherry adding (1− δ)θµ cherry trees
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to the stock of informed trees each day. The steady state condition for N∗ is then:




Maturing trees Trees held Trees bought Trees of
held by the non- by the dying from proceeds of non-dying
dying informed informed. maturing trees. new-borns.
(2.7)
We can define all equilibrium stocks and flows in the economy in terms of N∗ and Y ∗.
These stocks and flows are illustrated in figure 1 below:
Figure 1: Stocks and Flows in the Constant Price Equilibrium
Markets must clear. In figure 1 we see the total number of trees sold by the dying and the
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newborn is:
Tree Sales = δ + (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ;




and the quantity of these tress that are cherry is:
Cherry Sales = γδ.
Cherry trees from dying
informed and uninformed.
(2.9)
The informed buy only cherry trees:
Informed Cherry Purchases = (1− δ)µ(l + ∆)N
∗
p∗
+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ
Cherry trees bought from Cherry trees bought
proceeds of maturing by non-dying
cherry trees held by non- informed
dying informed. new-borns.
(2.10)
The uninformed purchase the residual trees, a fraction of which are cherry:
Uninformed Cherry = q∗
{
δ + (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ−
[
(1− δ)µ(l + ∆)N
∗
p∗
+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ
]}
Purchases
Trees sold − Informed cherry purchases
= q∗
[






Hence, the market clearing condition for cherry trees2 is:
2Which also implies market clearing for lemon trees. Total lemon tree sales is: Lemon Sales =
Tree Sales − Cherry Sales. Total lemon tree purchases is: Lemon Purchases = (1 − q∗)[Tree Sales −
Informed Cherry Purchases]. Letting Lemon Sales = Lemon Purchases and rearranging yields equation
(2.12).
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γδ = (1− δ)µ(l + ∆)N
∗
p∗
+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ + q∗
[









terms in the market clearing condition yields:














= (1− δ)θµ (2.14)




(2.14) and rearranging gives the quadratic:





[δ + (1− δ)]− (1− δ)µ
}
[δ(γ − q∗)− (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ] (2.15)
=0
Given the equilibrium behaviour of informed and uninformed traders we require that the
solution to this quadratic lies in the interval of [0, γ].
The quadratic function Φ(.) can be written more compactly as:
Φ(q) = a2q





[δ + (1− δ)µ] > 0. (2.17)
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The coefficient on the square term, a2, is positive and a0 is less than zero by assumption
(Assumption 1 section 2). Therefore, if Φ(γ) > 0, there exists a unique q∗ ∈ [0, γ] such
that Φ(q∗) = 0. Define qN such that:
3
δ(γ − qN )− (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ = 0. (2.18)
It is clear that qN < γ. We can see that qN > 0 by assumption 2. As a0 < 0 it follows
that
−lγδ2 + θµl(1− γ)(1− δ) < 0
⇒ δγ − (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ > 0, (2.19)
and therefore:
γ > qN > 0. (2.20)
Evaluate the sign of Φ(.) at 0 and qN :
Φ(0) = a0 < 0 (2.21)
Φ(qN ) = (1− δ)2µ2θ(1− qN ) > 0. (2.22)
Therefore there exists a unique q∗ ∈ [0, γ] such that Φ(q∗) = 0 as shown in figure 2
below:
3qN because from (2.13) N
∗ = 0 where q = qN .
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Figure 2
Next, it is shown that N∗ > 0. Examining the right hand side of the quadratic in (2.15),
when q∗ = 0 the first term is positive and, from equation (2.22), so is the final term in
brackets. As Φ(0) < 0 it must be the case that
l + q∗∆
l + ∆
[δ + (1− δ)]− (1− δ)µ > 0. (2.23)




and therefore N∗ > 0 for q∗ ∈ [0, γ].
The stock of uninformed cherry trees held over night, (γ − N∗), must also be greater
than zero. In steady state the uninformed lose as many cherry trees as they gain. Hence,
(γ −N∗) solves
(γ −N∗)[δ + (1− δ)µ] = γ(1− δ)(1− θ)µ + q∗
[




Cherry lost to death Cherry held by Uninformed cherry purchases.
and maturation. undying newborns.
(2.24)
If the right hand side is positive then γ−N∗ is positive. The number of cherry trees gained
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by the uninformed each period is positive if the number of cherry trees purchased by the
uninformed is positive. Rearranging the market clearing condition (2.12) gives:
(γ − q∗)
[




= (1− δ)(1− γ)
[





which implies that uninformed cherry purchases are positive, i.e., their steady state stock
of cherry trees is positive.
Finally, we show that the steady state stock of fruit held overnight by the uninformed
is positive. The uninformed hold all the fruit in the economy. The steady state stock
of fruit in the economy is where total daily fruit consumption equals total daily fruit
production.
Dying traders consume their fruit held from the previous day, δY ∗; the fruit from selling
their trees, δp∗; and the fruit from their maturing trees held from the previous day, δµ(l+
γ∆).4 Fruit production is due only to maturing trees and is equal to µ(l + γ∆). Thus Y ∗
solves
δY ∗ + δp∗ + δµ(l + γ∆) = µ(l + γ∆).
Fruit Consumed by the Dying Fruit from Maturing Trees
(2.26)
Substituting out p∗ in (2.26) and rearranging implies that Y ∗ is positive if:
(1− δ)µ(l + γ∆)− δ(l + q∗∆) > 0.
q∗ ≤ γ hence a sufficient condition for Y ∗ > 0 is:
(1− δ)µ > δ,
which follows immediately from assumption 2.
2.4 Saw-Tooth Equilibrium
In this equilibrium the market price deterministically oscillates between low on odd days,
p1, and high on even days, p0. Correspondingly, the quality of trees purchased from the
4Fruit is consumed only by the dying. Death is i.i.d. so the average dying trader holds the average of
the economy.
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market by the uninformed oscillates between low on odd days, q1, and high on even days,
q0.
On even days all traders sell their trees. All trees sold on even days are purchased by
non-dying uninformed traders – no tree is purchased by an informed trader. On even days
all trees are sold, the average tree sold is the population average, and informed traders do
not cherry pick the market. Hence, the quality of trees purchased by the uninformed on
even days is the quality of the population, i.e., q0 = γ.
5
On odd days the dying traders sell all their trees and new born informed traders switch
any lemon trees they carry for cherry (as described in section 2 ) these are the only trees
sold on an odd day. Death is i.i.d. so the trees sold by the dying are the population
average. The non-dying informed traders exchange all their fruit for cherry trees – cherry
picking trees sold by the dying. The uninformed purchase the residual stock of trees sold
by the dying and the lemons sold by the new-born informed traders. Hence, the quality of
trees purchased by the uninformed on odd days is lower than the population average, i.e.,
q1 < q0 = γ.
2.4.1 Incentive Compatibility and Prices
Surprisingly, on even days, non-dying informed traders sell trees they know to be cherry
to non-dying uninformed traders who only believe the tree is cherry with probability γ.
This trade is only possible because of the differing investment horizons of the (non-dying)
informed and uninformed traders.
On even days the non-dying informed traders have a shorter investment horizon than
the non-dying uninformed: the return to informed traders from purchasing cherry trees is
higher on odd days than on even days – so informed traders want to maximise the funds they
have available for odd day investments. However, tree holdings suffer a temporary capital
loss on odd days when prices drop from p0 to p1 – exactly when informed traders need
funds for investment. Hence, informed traders are willing to pay a liquidity premium for
fruit and take less than the value, (l+∆), of a cherry tree’s long-run dividend stream.
Non-dying uninformed traders, on the other hand, intend to hold even day trees for the
long term – only selling the tree (in effect) when they die. The uninformed traders, if they
do not die on the odd day, are unaffected by the temporary capital loss as they (mainly)
value the asset for its dividend stream. The longer investment horizon of the uninformed
5Note, that the behaviour of the non-dying uninformed is equivalent to holding their population average
trees, those they hold from the previous even day or with which they were born, and only selling those
trees purchased on odd days.
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then allows for gains from trade between the non-dying informed and uninformed traders
despite the fact that the informed traders know they are selling their cherry trees for less
than the ‘true’ value.
The volume of trade on odd days is lower than on even days as only the dying and new-born
informed with lemons are selling. Trade between the dying and the non-dying occurs due to
(the more conventional reason of) different preferences over trees and fruit. Trade between
the non-dying informed and uninformed occurs because the informed are selling trees
they know to be lemons to traders who believe that the trees are cherry with probability
q1 > 0.
Incentive compatibility of the uninformed strategy follows from the non-dying uninformed
being indifferent between pt fruit and a tree of quality qt at date t. On even days they
are indifferent between p0 fruit and trees of quality γ and so, on even days, must strictly
prefer p0 fruit to trees of quality q1, so they sell odd day trees on even days. By the same
argument, on odd days, they must strictly prefer trees of quality γ to p1 fruit, so they
don’t sell population trees on odd days.
Before showing incentive compatibility for the informed it is useful to have expressions for
prices on odd and even days. The non-dying uninformed are making speculative purchases
with an intent to resell the following day when prices are high. Their hope is that the tree
won’t mature before they have a chance to sell it and claim the capital gains. Setting p1
equal to the expected return then yields:
p1 = µ(l + q1∆) + (1− µ)p0 (2.27)
The price on even days is lower than the value, (l + γ∆), of a population tree’s dividend
stream because the bearer suffers a capital loss if they die on an odd day before the tree has
matured. There are four disjoint outcomes for an uninformed trader holding a population
tree:
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Day of Event Event Expected Payoff Probability
Odd Tree Matures (l + γ∆) µ
Odd Tree Doesn’t Mature p1 (1− µ)δ
Trader dies
Even Tree Matures (l + γ∆) (1− µ)(1− δ)µ
Even Tree Doesn’t Mature p0 (1− µ)2(1− δ)
Setting price equal to expected value yields
p0 = µ(l + γ∆) + (1− µ)δp1 + (1− µ)(1− δ)µ(l + γ) + (1− µ)2(1− δ)p0. (2.28)
Substituting equation (2.27) for p1 in (2.28) and rearranging gives the following expression
for price on even days:




Which is the expected value of a population tree’s dividend stream less the expected capital
loss from having to sell in the event of dying on an odd day. It is worth noting for future
reference that both p0 and p1 are affine functions of q1.
It is easy to check that the price does in fact oscillate. From equation (2.27), p0 > p1 if
and only if p0 > (l + q1∆). Subtracting l + q1∆ from (2.29) and rearranging yields






which is greater than zero for q1 < γ. In any feasible saw-tooth equilibrium the price on
even days is higher than the price on odd days.
Returning to incentive compatibility, if an informed trader purchases a cherry tree on an
odd day they can always sell on the subsequent day if it does not mature. Hence, the value
of a cherry tree to an informed trader on an odd day is bounded below by
µ(l + ∆) + (1− µ)p0 > p1,
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i.e. it is always optimal for non-dying informed traders, on odd days, to exchange all their
fruit for cherry trees.
From this, on any odd day, informed traders either exchange their portfolio for cherry
trees or, if they are dying, exchange their portfolio for fruit, which they then consume. In
either event the informed traders utility is linearly increasing in the market value of their
portfolio that day. Given, the optimal behaviour on odd days, the non-dying informed
traders’ decision problem on the even day is to maximise the expected value of their
portfolio at price p1 on the subsequent odd day.
Returns are linear so we can restrict attention to the decision of holding p0 fruit versus
holding a single cherry tree at the end of the even day. The expected market value of a
cherry tree held over from the even day is µ(l + ∆) + (1 − µ)p1. Therefore, the informed
traders’ strategy is incentive compatible if and only if
p0 ≥ µ(l + ∆) + (1− µ)p1.
Using the price equations, (2.27) and (2.29), to substitute out p0 and p1 above and rear-
ranging gives the following incentive compatibility condition for informed traders:
0 ≤ F ≡ −(1− γ) + (γ − q1)(1− δ)(1− µ). (2.30)
We will show later that given the assumptions in section 2 this condition always holds.
2.4.2 Market Clearing
The total equilibrium stocks of fruit held over even nights by informed traders and un-
informed traders are W0 and Y0 respectively. The total equilibrium stock of cherry trees
held over odd nights by informed traders is
W1
p1
and the total equilibrium stock of fruit
held over odd nights is Y1.
Figure 3 shows the stocks and flows of trees and fruit on even days.
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Figure 3: Stocks and Flows on Even Days
Looking at figure 3, the non-dying informed exchange all unmatured cherry trees – both









fruit from the cherry trees that matured on the morning of the even day. The informed had
no fruit over the odd night and purchased no trees on the even day so the fruit holdings
of the informed over even nights is
W0 = (1− δ){
W1
p1
[µ(l + ∆) + (1− µ)p0] + θµp0}. (2.31)
Figure 4 shows the stocks and flows of trees and fruit on odd days.
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Figure 4: Stocks and Flows on Odd Days
Looking at figure 4, the non-dying informed exchange their fruit stock for
(1− δ)W0
p1
cherry trees on the odd day; and gain (1− δ)θµ cherry trees from the non-dying newborn
informed, of which a fraction (1−γ)θµ were acquired by using the market to replace lemon






The informed hold no fruit over the odd night.
We can now go on to define the market clearing conditions on odd days. In figure 4 we see
the total number of trees sold by the dying and the newborn is:
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Tree Sales = δ + (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ;




and the quantity of these tress that are cherry is:
Cherry Sales = γδ.
cherry trees from dying
informed and uninformed
(2.34)
The informed buy only cherry trees:
Informed Cherry Purchases = (1− δ)W0
p1
+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ
cherry trees bought from cherry trees bought




The uninformed purchase the residual trees, a fraction q1 of which are cherry:
Uninformed Cherry = q1
{




+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ
]}
Purchases
Trees Sold − Informed Cherry Purchases
= q1
[





Hence, the market clearing condition for cherry trees on odd days6 is:
6Which also implies market clearing for lemon trees. Total lemon tree sales is: Lemon Sales =
Tree Sales − Cherry Sales. Total lemon tree purchases is: Lemon Purchases = (1 − q∗)[Tree Sales −
Informed Cherry Purchases]. Letting Lemon Sales = Lemon Purchases and rearranging yields equation
(2.37).
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γδ = (1− δ)W0
p1
+ (1− γ)(1− δ)θµ + q1
[









terms in the market clearing condition yields:




Solving the steady state equations for W0 and
W1
p1







p1 − (1− δ)2 [µ(l + ∆) + (1− µ)p0]
}




using (2.38), and rearranging yields:
Φ̃(q1) ≡(1− δ)2(1− q1)θµ {(1− δ)µ(l + ∆) + [1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)]p0}
−
{
p1 − (1− δ)2 [µ(l + ∆) + (1− µ)p0]
}
[(γ − q1)δ − (1− δ)(1− γ)θµ]
=0 (2.40)
Φ̃(q1) is quadratic in q1 as both p0 and p1 are affine functions of q1:
Φ̃(q1) = ã2(q1)
2 + ã1q1 + ã0 (2.41)
where





(2− µ)− [1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)](1− δ)2θ(1− µ)
}
+ δ3∆(1− µ)2 2− δ
2− µ
> 0 (2.42)
ã2 > 0 follows from [1 + (1 − δ)(1 − µ)] < 2 − µ and by assumption 4 ã0 < 0. As in the
constant price equlibrium, Φ̃(0) < 0 and the co-efficient on the quadratic component is
positive so we can show a unique q1 ∈ [0, γ] solves the quadratic if Φ̃(γ) > 0.
Examining (2.40) it is clear that the argument used in the constant price equilibrium also
applies here: q1 = qN ∈ (0, γ) and Φ̃(qN ) > 0 so there exists a unique q1 ∈ (0, γ) that
solves the quadratic.
Examining (2.38) the left hand side is positive where q1 ∈ (0, qN ). Therefore where q1
solves Φ̃(.) the fruit holdings of the informed over even nights is positive, W0 > 0. This
also implies that the odd night cherry holdings for the informed is positive at the solution








Over even nights the uninformed hold the entire stock of trees in the economy. Over odd
nights the uninformed hold the entire stock of lemon trees and all those cherry trees not




= (1− δ)(1− µ)γ + (1− δ)γ(1− θ)µ + q1
[
δ − (1− δ)W0
p1
]
Uninformed cherry Residual stock Endowment of Cherry trees
trees held over from even night non-dying purchased by
odd nights new-borns uninformed
(2.43)
The right hand side is positive if the uninformed purchase a positive amount of cherry
trees. Rearranging the market clearing condition (2.37):
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(γ − q1)
[
δ − (1− δ)W0
p1
]







The right hand side positive so it follows that
δ − (1− δ)W0
p1
> 0,
and hence cherry purchases of the uninformed on odd days are greater than zero. That is,
the uninformed hold a positive stock of cherry trees over odd nights.
The uninformed hold weakly positive stocks of fruit over even and odd nights: Y0 > 0 and
Y1 > 0. Over even nights
Y0 =(1− δ)Y1+
+(1− δ)[ fruit from maturing trees of the uninformed ]
−p0[Number of trees sold excluding the sales of the non-dying uninformed] (2.45)
fruit. Before the market on even days the market value of all the trees in the economy not
owned by the non-dying uninformed is the expression on the third line.
On the odd days, the non-dying uninformed keep fraction (1 − δ) of the fruit held over
the even night. As they hold all trees in the economy over even nights the non-dying
uninformed receive a fraction (1 − δ) of all the fruit from maturing trees in the economy.
They also purchase all the trees sold by the dying less those bought by the informed. Over
odd nights the uninformed fruit holding then is




The uninformed hold over odd nights, as stated earlier, [(1− δ)(1− µ) + (1− δ)(1− θ)µ]
trees of quality γ and
δ − (1− δ)W0
p1
trees of quality q1. This implies that the uninformed maturing trees yield
µ(1− δ)[(1− µ) + (1− θ)µ](l + γ∆) + µ[δ − (1− δ)W0
p1
](l + q1∆)
fruit on even days. Excluding the sales of the non-dying uninformed, the trees sold on even
days are those sold by the dying and those sold by the non-dying uninformed, which is a
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total of
δ + (1− δ)2(1− µ)W0
p1
+ (1− δ)2(1− µ)θµ+ (1− δ)θµ
trees.
Using these values and substituting for Y1 in equation (2.45) using equation (2.46) we
get












δ + (1− δ)2(1− µ)W0
p1
+ (1− δ)2(1− µ)θµ+ (1− δ)θµ
}
. (2.47)
Substituting for p1 above with equation (2.27) and rearranging implies Y0 ≥ 0 if and only
if
µ(1− δ)2(l + γ∆)(2− θµ) ≥ p0[δ + (1− δ)θµ][1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)].
Given that p0 ≤ (l + γ∆) a sufficient condition for Y0 ≥ 0 is




]− θ > 0 (2.48)
which is true by assumption 2.
Assumption 2 also implies that Y1 ≥ 0. The value of Y0 ≥ 0 that minimises Y1 is Y0 = 0.
Putting this into equation (2.46)and rearranging yields
Y1 = [(l + γ∆)(1− δ)µ− δp1] + (1− δ)W0.
Therefore Y1 ≥ 0 if (l + γ∆)(1− δ)µ− δp1. Given (l + γ∆) ≥ p1 a sufficient condition for
Y1 ≥ 0 is
µ(1− δ) > δ
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, which is weaker than assumption 2.
It still remains to demonstrate that the equilibrium behaviour for the informed is incentive
compatible. In particular that:
0 ≤ F ≡ −(1− γ) + (γ − q1)(1− δ)(1− µ), (2.49)
where Φ̃(q1) = 0 for some q1 ∈ (0, γ).
F is decreasing in q1. Define, qF as that value of q1 which implies F = 0:




Observe that qF > 0 where
γ >
1
1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)
which is assumption 4. From rearranging (2.18) and subtracting qF :




δ − (1− δ)2µ(1− µ)θ
]
.
Which is greater than 0 as we know from assumption 1 that δ > (1− δ)2µ.
As qN > qF we must demonstrate that q1 ∈ [0, qF ] solves Φ̃(q1) = 0. This can be done if
it is demonstrated that Φ̃(qF ) > 0, i.e.
Figure 5
It can be shown that assumption 5 implies Φ̃(qF ) > 0 and hence there exists a unique
incentive compatible q1 ∈ [0, γ] that solves Φ̃(q1) = 0.
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2.5 A Numerical Example
Suppose an economy in which 1% of the population is informed; there are 50% more cherry
trees than lemon and each cherry tree produces 50% more fruit than a lemon. Finally, one
















The price on odd days is 2% lower than on even days. From within a completely stationary
environment prices cycle deterministically from high to low to high.
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Appendix
Proposition 2.1. There exists a set of parameters that satisfy assumptions 1 through 5.
To show this set of parameters exist consider the case where ∆→ 0.
Lemma 2.1. If assumption 3 holds when ∆→ 0 then assumption 1 holds when ∆→ 0.
Proof:
(∆→ 0)⇒ a0 → lθµ(1− δ)[(1− γ)δ + (1− δ)µ]− lγδ2
which is less than zero if and only if
γδ2 > θµ(1− δ)[(1− γ)δ + (1− δ)µ] (2.52)
Turn to ã0 from Assumption 3:
(∆→ 0)⇒ ã0 → (2− δ)l{θµ(1− δ)[1− δγ]− γδ2}
which is less than zero if and only if
γδ2 > θµ(1− δ)[1− δγ]. (2.53)
The right hand side of inequality (2.53) is larger than the right hand side of inequality
(2.52). Therefore,
(ã0 < 0)⇒ (a0 < 0)

Lemma 2.2. There exists a set of parameters consistent with assumption 3 and 5 as
∆→ 0.
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As ∆→ 0 assumption 5 tends to
0 < (2− δ)l
[
θµ(1− δ)2(2− µ)− δ2
]
(2.55)











(2.57) is possible for any set of parameters satisfying:
γ >
1
1 + (1− δ)(1− µ)
(2.58)

Note that (2.58) in the proof of lemma 2.2 is assumption 4. Hence assumption 4 is com-
patible with assumptions 3 and 5. From lemma 2.1 it then follows that there is a set of
parameters consistent with assumptions 1, 3,4 and 5.
Finally, we turn to assumption 2:
θ < 1− δ
(1− δ)µ
. (2.59)
The lower bound on a value for θ compatible with all five assumptions, as a function of
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There exists a θ such that
δ2
µ(1− δ)2(2− µ)
< θ < 1− δ
(1− δ)µ
(2.61)
when δ is sufficiently small relative to µ. There exists a γ such that assumption 4 is satisfied
for any pair of µ and δ. Hence there exists a set of parameters compatible with assump-
tions 2 and 4. From lemma 2.2 assumption 4 implies there exists parameters that satisfy
assumptions 3 and 5 when ∆ rightarrow 0. From 2.1 assumption 3 implies assumption 1
when ∆ rightarrow 0.

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Chapter 3
Identifying the Effect of Privilege
on Intergenerational Mobility:
A Twin Decomposition Method.
James Best
The intergenerational elasticity of income is the standard measurement economists
use for intergenerational mobility. It is not clear how we should interpret in-
tergenerational elasticities. Particularly, high intergenerational elasticities
could either reflect inequality of opportunity or the importance of geneti-
cally heritable characteristics in determining genes. Behavioural geneticists
have long been using a twin based variance decomposition method, the ACE
model, to estimate the genetic heritability of various characteristics. It is
not clear, however, what this approach implies for intergenerational mobility
of equality of opportunity.
In this chapter I develop a novel method that extends the methodology used
in behavioural genetics to identifying how much of the intergenerational
elasticity of income is determined by the presence (absence) of environmen-
tal privileges associated with being children of high (low) earners. Using
this approach we can examine the counterfactuals of giving a poorer child
the environment of a richer child; equalising the privileges associated with
family income; and equalising the family environmental factors not associ-
ated with parental income. Furthermore, this method allows us to identify
how good parental income is as a measure of family environment. The model
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I develop nests the behavioural genetics model allowing us to relax some of
the identifying assumptions used in the standard ACE model.
Finally, I apply this method to data on the income elasticities between Amer-
ican males of different types of relation: fraternal twins, identical twins and
father-son relationships. The results of this application suggest that a 1
percent increase in the privilege associated with parental income increases
child income by about 1 tenth of a percent. Equalising, to the mean, the
environmental privileges across the population results in about a 30 percent
drop in the intergenerational elasticity of income and a 5 percent drop in
the variance of income across the population. These results must be treated
tentatively as the twin data comes from a separate survey to the data on
intergenerational elasticities.
3.1 Introduction
High earning parents tend to have high earning children Chetty et al. (2014). The extent
of this intergenerational persistence in earnings varies across countries (Jantti et al., 2006;
Corak, 2011) and time (Lee and Solon, 2009). There seems, furthermore, to be a relation-
ship between the extent of the intergenerational persistence of earnings in a country and
the extent of inequality in a country.
Source: Corak (2011)
This relationship was described by Krueger (2012) as the “Great Gatsby Curve”. This
name reflects a concern, voiced by economists and non-economists alike, that income in-
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equality amongst parents is translating into inequality of opportunity for their children
and this inequality of opportunity is causing low levels of intergenerational mobility. Put
another way, income is determined by privilege and privilege is exacerbated by income
inequality. However, an alternative explanation, argued most (in)famously by Herrnstein
and Murray (1994), is that the persistence in earnings is due to the genetic transmission of
capabilities from parent to child. The policy implications of low intergenerational mobility
and high inequality depend greatly on the extent to which these features of the economy
are explained by genetics and the extent to which they are explained by variation in the
environment provided for children by their families and those around them.
In this paper, I show how to decompose the intergenerational elasticity of income into these
two components: the effect of environmental privileges associated with parental income on
child outcomes, and the genetic transmission of capabilities between parent and child. I
incorporate the standard twin decomposition approach used within behavioural genetics
(Neale and Cardon, 1992) into a simple model where there is intergenerational transmission
of a characteristic such as income, education or IQ. This method, using data on the income
of identical twins, fraternal twins, and their parents can place bounds on the effect of the
privileges associated with parental income on inequality and intergenerational mobility. A
further contribution of this method is that it relaxes some, but certainly not all, of the
assumptions present in the canonical twin decomposition approach.
I apply this method, speculatively, to existent data on income elasticities for American
males and their fathers (Lee and Solon, 2009), and for male American identical twins and
fraternal twins (Taubman, 1976). The results from this data imply that the privileges
associated with paternal income are responsible for about thirty percent of the intergener-
ational elasticity of income and five percent of the variation in income. The fact that the
income elasticities between fathers and sons come from a different source, and cohort, to
those between different types of twins is a potential source of bias. Consequently, too much
weight should not be put on the empirical results reported in this paper. These results
are useful, however, for demonstrating this paper’s methodological contribution and its
implications.
The standard twin decomposition approach, or ACE model, uses data on the correlation
between identical twins (raised in the same family) and fraternal twins (raised in the same
family). This approach takes advantage of the fact that identical twins have all their
genes in common while fraternal (non-identical) twins do not. Particularly, when there
is random mating, Mendel’s laws of genetics imply the correlation between the genetic
polymorphisms of fraternal twins is half. Using this fact, and other assumptions to be
discussed later, it can be estimated how much of the variation in some characteristic is
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explained by ‘additive genetics’, by ‘common environment’ and by ‘unique environment’.
Where common environment refers to the environmental elements which twins share due
to being born and raised in the same family, for this reason it is often referred to as ‘family
environment’. Unique environment refers to that part of a twin’s environment which is
uncorrelated with their genes.
The headline result of the ACE model is that the proportion of variance explained by genes,
typically denoted as a2 for ‘additive genetics’, is twice the difference in the correlation of
identical twins and fraternal twins. Suppose the outcome of interest were IQ then
a2 = 2 [Corr(IQ1, IQ2|identical twins)− Corr(IQ1, IQ2|fraternal twins)] .
The proportion of variance explained by family environment, typically denoted as c2 for
‘common environment’, is the difference between twice the correlation of fraternal twins
and the correlation of identical twins, so for IQ this would be
c2 = 2 Corr(IQ1, IQ2|fraternal twins)− Corr(IQ1, IQ2|identical twins).
Finally, the proportion explained by the unique environment of a twin, e2, is that part of
variance not explained by either genes or family.
The ACE model, and variants thereof, have been used by behavioural geneticists to ex-
amine IQ, education, personality, willpower, and many more characteristics since at least
Merriman (1924). Turkheimer (2000) states that the first two laws of behavioural genetics
are 1) all human behavioural characteristics are heritable; and 2) the effect of being raised
in the same family is smaller than the effect of genes. A review by Boomsma et al. (2002)
reports that the effect of being raised in the same family is zero for many behavioural
traits, including the IQ of adults. There have also been some studies by economists which
examine income directly. The main one1 examining the income of American twins is Taub-
man (1976). He finds that genes explain 48% and family environment explains 6% of the
variance in income.
The above findings of behavioural geneticists and economists using the classic twin study
seem to lend some prima facie support to the argument that the persistence of earnings
and inequality in earnings is largely due to genes. However, these results do not give
the effect on children of the environmental advantages associated with parental income.
Consequently, the implications of these results for intergenerational mobility are unclear.
Nor do these results tell us the effect on inequality of removing the environmental advan-
tages associated with higher parental incomes. Goldberger (1979) and Manski (2011) are
1There is later work using the same twin data set but the methodology and results are very similar.
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particularly scathing about the policy relevance of these results.
The reason these models are unable to provide answers to these questions is because they
are silent on what constitutes the ‘common environment’ of twins. By incorporating these
models into a model of intergenerational mobility we can examine the effects of that part
of family environment which is explained by parental income and its correlates. This also
allows us to evaluate the importance in determining children’s outcomes of those features of
the family environment which are unassociated with (are orthogonal to) parental income2.
Most importantly, however, we can run the counterfactual experiment of equalising the
environmental advantages, privileges, associated with parental income.
The standard ACE model also requires a series of covariance restrictions in order to iden-
tify the relevant parameters. One of these restrictions is that the family environment is
uncorrelated with genes. This restriction is very strong in the case of many characteristics.
Take income as the point in case, where the estimate of heritability of income is substan-
tial. For genes to be uncorrelated with family environment in this case one of the following
must be true: a) parental income is not a relevant part of shared environment; b) child
income is heritable parental income is not; or c) those genes relevant to parental income
are no longer relevant for child income.
“The Bell Curve” (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) while the most well known argument
for the heritability hypotheses of intergenerational mobility has many flaws. Bowles et al.
(2001) and Bowles and Gintis (2002) are more thorough in examining how intergenerational
mobility is explained by IQ and other heritable measures. They find that the heritability
of IQ explains little of the intergenerational persistence in earnings. Their result is driven
chiefly by the fact that IQ does not explain a large proportion of income variation. Further
work by Blanden et al. (2007) examine the effect of cognitive and non-cognitive skills. They
find that they account for about half the intergenerational elasticity. They, contra Bowles
et al. (2001), do not do not access the potential role for genes as a mechanism by which
cognitive and non-cognitive skills are transmitted from parents to children.
Björklund and Jäntti (2009) is the closest research to my own. They use excellent Swedish
data in which there are many different types of siblings to relax and directly estimate some
of the correlations in environment and genes between different types of relations. This is
similar to the method used for relaxing the restriction on the correlation between genes
and family environment in this paper. However, they do not apply their methodology to
examining intergenerational mobility or estimating the environmental impact of privileges
associated with parental income.
2Note that this gives an estimate of the extent of measurement error of parental income as a measure
of family investment.
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There is also a literature on estimating the returns to education using identical twins such
as that of Krueger and Ashenfelter (1994) and Isacsson (1999). The identical twin approach
rests on an assumption that identical twins have identical ability and therefore the effects
of any variation in schooling can be taken as the returns to schooling. For a critique
of this approach see Bound and Solon (1999). This approach is completely different to
the variance decomposition approach applied in the ACE model. One of the many large
differences is that they answer different questions. The ACE model tells us about the
relative importance of variation across family environment in explaining the population
variation in some particular outcome. The identical twin approach used for estimating
the returns to education examines the effect of some particular environmental factor that
varies within a family.
There are reasons to be sceptical of the assumptions underlying the ACE model. There
are issues regarding assortative mating, gene-environment interactions, twin interactions,
non-linearities in the effects of genes and correlation between family environment and genes
that will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. The method I develop allows us
to deal with one of these issues, the assumption of family environment being uncorrelated
with genes. Also it allows us to interpret the twin study results in a way that is meaningful
for the debate over inequality and intergenerational mobility.
In section II, I introduce the ACE model and its identifying assumptions. In section III,
I introduce my model in which the classic twin approach is embedded in a simple model
of intergenerational mobility and show how we can use it to identify the effect of privilege
on child outcomes. In section IV, I describe several counterfactual experiments and how
my model can be used to estimate the effects. In section V, I apply my method to existent
results on twin elasticities and intergenerational elasticities. In this section I also give the
results of the counterfactual experiments described in section IV. In section VI, I discuss
some of the limitations of the approach and the data used in section V.
3.2 The Behavioural Genetics Benchmark
3.2.1 The ACE Model
The ACE model is the benchmark model used within behavioural genetics: ‘A’ stands for
‘additive genetics’; ‘C’ for common environment; and ‘E’ for unique environment. For a
twin, in some family i, Ai refers to their genetic endowment. Common environment, Ci,
refers to those environmental factors that they share with their twin. Unique environment,
Ei, refers to those environmental factors that are unique to a twin, i.e. not shared with
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their twin, and are also independent of their genes.
It is assumed that the effect of genes on some outcome are additively separably from the
effects of environment. Moreover, the effect of any particular genetic polymorphism is
independent of the presence of other genes. In an additive genetic model we can think of





Where gi,l is a dummy variable for the presence of genetic polymorphism l and bl is the




The ACE model does not make use of directly measured genetic polymorphisms3, i.e. mea-
surements of gl or
∑L
l=1 blgi,l are not included in the model. Instead the genetic endowment
is treated as a latent, that is unobserved, factor. Our knowledge of Mendelian genetics
can, conditional on the modelling assumptions, be then used to infer how important genes
are in explaining the variation of some outcome in the population, and by extension, to
explain the importance of environment.
Let ωj,ri be the outcome of interest in family i for twin j in a twin pair with relatedness
r ∈ {mz, dz}. Relatedness, r ∈ {mz, dz}, denotes whether the twins are monozygotic, mz,
or dizygotic, dz. Recall that monozygotic twins are identical twins and dizygotic twins are







To simplify notation the superscripts are dropped when we are only considering an indi-
vidual and not their twin. ωi, Ai, Ci and Ei are all normalised so that they are distributed
in the population with mean 0 and variance 1. The outcome of an individual is then
ωi = aAi + cCi + eEi (3.1)
3Recently, technology has been developed that can directly measure genetic polymorphisms relatively
cheaply. Unfortunately the number of polymorphisms for any individual dwarf the number of people within
the samples and, at this time, attempts to directly estimate the effects of genes on complex traits, such as
IQ or income, have been largely unsuccessful. There has been some research finding that some particular
genetic polymorphism has a tiny effect on complex traits such as IQ, however, when these tests have been
replicated the effects have disappeared.
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3.2.2 Identification
Ai, Ci and Ei, being latent factors, are unobserved and hence can be normalised so that
their respective population distributions have mean zero and variance one. To identify
a, c and e behavioural geneticists impose a set of restrictions on the variance-covariance
structure between the factors of individuals; between the factors of identical twins; and
between the factors of fraternal twins.
Before proceeding further it is useful to establish some notation. The correlation in out-
come, ωi, for identical twins is denoted as
µ = Corr(ω1,mzi , ω
2,mz
i );
and for fraternal twins as
δ = Corr(ω1,dzi , ω
2,dz
i ).
µ is for ‘monozygotic’ and δ is for ‘dizygotic’. The correlation in some factor X for identical












When the correlation is between a factor X and a factor Y then the correlation for identical












and for individuals by
ιXY = Corr(Xi, Yi).











We can now return to the specifics of the restrictions imposed on the relevant variance
covariance matrices. The identifying restrictions on the factor variance-covariance structure
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1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

E is defined as that part of a twins environment which they do not share with their twin
and that is also uncorrelated with their genes. Hence, ιAE = ιCE = 0 by definition.
However, ιAC = 0 only by assumption. That is it is assumed that family environment is
uncorrelated with genes. As discussed in the introduction this is a strong and implausible
assumption that my method allows us to relax.









1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 ;








0.5 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
 .
The correlation of 1 for the genes of identical twins follow because their genes are identical.
The restriction of the correlation of a half for the genes of the fraternal twins, δA = 0.5,
relies on Mendel’s first and second law and an assumption of random mating.
Many of the correlations involving the unique environment factor follow by definition. First,
if it were not the case that µE = δE = 0 then E
j,r
i would not be unique to twin j. Second,
the common environment of twins is identical i.e.C1,ri = C
2,r
i . It follows from this that
if one twin’s unique environment, Ej,ri , is uncorrelated with their common environment,
Cj,ri , it must also be uncorrelated with their twins common environment, C
j,r
i – that is
µEC = δEC = 0.
It may also seem, at first glance, that the definition of common environment, C1,ri = C
2,r
i ,





Var(Cj,mzi ) = Var(C
j,dz
i ) = 1 is an assumption that the common environment component is
as important for identical twins as it is for fraternal twins. This is often, and misleadingly,
referred to as the equal environment assumption.
While there are valid concerns over the equal environment assumption let’s examine a
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particularly common criticism which is misconceived. A persons genes evoke different en-
vironmental responses and can also cause them to actively seek out different environments.
For example, people may be kinder to more beautiful people or people who are naturally
bright may seek out more stimulating environments. Identical twins share more genes in
common than fraternal twins and so the environments that they evoke and seek out will
be more similar. Consequently, it is reasonable to say that identical twins share more
environment in common than do identical twins. Thus, so the argument goes, the equal
environment assumption is deeply flawed.
This argument is flawed because it misinterprets how genes, Ai, affect the outcome of
interest. The estimate of the effect of genes on the outcome includes two kinds of effects
of a child’s genes on their own environment: 1) that their genes might evoke particular
environments e.g. beautiful children are treated more kindly; and 2) that their genes
might cause them to seek out particular environments e.g. naturally bright children seek
out libraries. In the case of income, part of the effect of genes on income is that those
genes help lead to environments that are more conducive to earning. Hence, correlation
in environment caused by the mechanisms of evocation and active seeking discussed above
are not breaches of the so-called equal environment assumption.
Next, consider the assumption that µAE = δAE = 0. It is clear that µAE = 0 for the
same reason that ιAE = 0: identical twins have identical genes and so if one twin’s genes
are uncorrelated with their unique environment their genes must also be uncorrelated with
their twins unique environment. However, those genes a fraternal twin does not share in
common with their twin could be correlated with their twins unique environment. One
potential cause of this correlation is the fact that part of a twins’ environment is the genes
of their twin. The effect of this should be to make identical twins share more environment
than fraternal twins and the size of this effect depends greatly on how important a person’s
twin is for their own development.
Finally, it follows from the definition of common environment that ιAC = µAC = δAC .
Hence, the assumption of zero correlation between one twin’s common environment and
the other twin’s genes stands on the same (shaky) ground as the assumption of ιAC = 0.
My method, as will be seen, allows us to relax these assumptions.
Given these restrictions, the variance in outcomes is




2 + c2 + e2;
the correlation between identical twins is
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µ = α′E[y1,mzi (y
2,mz
i )
′]α = a2 + c2;
and the correlation between fraternal twins is
δ = α′E[y1,dzi (y
2,dz
i )
′]α = 0.5a2 + c2.
From these three moment conditions we can identify all three parameters of interest:
a2 =2(µ− δ), (3.2)
c2 =2δ − µ, (3.3)
e2 =1− µ. (3.4)
The interpretation of a2, c2 and e2 is the amount of variance in the outcome ωi that
is explained by additive genetics, shared environment and unique environment respec-
tively.
Given the identifying assumptions this model tells us what the effect on inequality is of
equalising the common environment of all twins. Particularly, it will reduce the variance
in income, or some other outcome of interest, by c2. We can also ask about the effect
of moving a child up one standard deviation in the distribution of common environment,
in expectation it would improve their outcome by c. However, this model is silent about
what constitutes common environment or what it would mean to move a child one standard
deviation in the distribution of common environment. Consequently, the results from the
ACE model does not identify the environmental effect of parental income and its associated
privileges on the income of children. With this in mind we can turn to the intergenerational
twin model which does allow us to identify this effect.
3.3 An Intergenerational Twin Model
I incorporate the standard ACE model into an intergenerational framework. This allows us
to examine the implications of the standard ACE model for the mechanisms which cause in-
tergenerational mobility, or lack there of. This method generalizes to the intergenerational
persistence of other characteristics such as education, IQ, unemployment, criminality and
so on. In the process of embedding the ACE model within an intergenerational framework
72 CHAPTER 3. PRIVILEGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
we are also able to relax some of the identifying assumptions in the standard behavioural
genetics model.
This model continues to use several assumptions from the behavioural genetics model.
Particularly, the additive genetics assumption; the random mating assumption; the equal
environment assumption; and the assumption that the genes of one twin are uncorrelated
with the unique environment of the other. It is no longer assumed, however, that shared




Factors are given a generational subscript, n, where generation n are the children of gener-
ation n−1. For example, ωj,ri,n is the outcome of interest for twin j in family i of generation
n and ωi,n−1 is the outcome of interest for that twin’s father or mother. Note that the
father is not necessarily (probably isn’t) a twin, hence the absence of superscripts.
As in the ACE model ωi,n is taken to be determined by a latent, i.e. unobserved, genetic
factor, Ai,n, and a latent unique environment factor, Ei,n. The common environment
factor, however, is decomposed into two parts: a part explained by parental income and
a part which is orthogonal to parental income. That part that is explained by parental
income is referred to from here on out as ‘privilege’. This factor is denoted as Pi,n. That
part which is orthogonal to parental income is (somewhat clumsily) referred to as ‘residual
family environment’. This factor is denoted as Fi,n. As Fi,n is independent of parental
income it is also independent of privilege:
Pi,n ⊥ Fi,n.
Both privilege, Pi,n, and the residual family environment, Fi,n, are normalised to have
mean 0 and variance 1. The effect of common environment in the ACE model is then the
combined effect of privilege and residual family environment in the intergenerational ACE
model:
cCi,n = pPi,n + fFi,n. (3.5)
p is the environmental impact of privilege, i.e. the environmental impact of parental income
and its correlates. Where as f is the environmental impact of the relevant components of
environment shared by both twins that are uncorrelated with parental income.
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Note that p captures part of parental investment, in a reduced form way. Income is an
imperfect measure of parental investment, see Heckman and Mosso (2014) for a richer
structural model of investment, but by identifying p and f we can better understand the
relationship between parental income and parental investment. It follows from (3.5) and
the independence of Pi,n and Fi,n that:
Var(cCi,n) = c
2 = p2 + f2.




of the common environment. Or put slightly differently, the correlation between parental





We can embed the ACE model within an intergenerational framework by using (3.5) to
substitute out for cCi,n in the standard ACE model:
4
ωi,n = aAi,n + pPi,n + fFi,n + eEi,n (3.8)
The intergenerational transmission of characteristics is characterised as a stationary pro-








The evolution of zi,n overtime is then a stationary vector auto-regressive factor model:
4It is important to realise that as Pi,n and ωi,n−1 are perfectly correlated that Pi,n in (3.8) could be
replaced by ωi,n−1. Privilege, Pi,n, is only used instead of parental income, ωi,n−1, to allow clarity of
exposition. Particularly, it is useful to keep parental income distinct from the environmental impact of
parental income and its correlates on children.
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The outcome of interest as a function of these four factors is:
ωi,n = β
′zi,n (3.9)






Bounds can be put on all parameters in β using 4 population moments, a stationarity as-
sumption, and a strict subset of the identifying restrictions used within the classic twin de-
composition model used in behavioural genetics. The moments are the covariance between
the outcomes of identical twins, Cov(ω1,mzi,n , ω
2,mz
i,n ); the covariance between the outcomes
of fraternal twins, Cov(ω1,dzi,n , ω
2,dz
i,n ); the covariance between parent outcome and child out-
come, Cov(ωi,n, ωi,n−1); and the variance of the outcome of interest, Var(ωi,n) = 1.
The notational conventions used in the ACE model are continued. There is some additional
notation. The intergenerational correlation between the outcome of the parent, ωi,n−1, and
the outcome of the child, ωi,n is denoted as
γ = Corr(ωi,n−1, ωi,n).
γ is for ‘generation’. The intergenerational correlation of some variable X other than the
outcome of interest is denoted as
γX = Corr(Xi,n−1, Xi,n).
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Finally, the correlation between the factor X of the parent and the factor Y of the child
is
γXY = Corr(Xi,n−1, Yi,n).
Note that the order of subscripts for intergenerational correlations, contra individual and
twin correlations, has significance. Particularly, the first subscript relates to the parent’s
factor and the second subscript to the child’s factor.
The primary goal of this exercise is to decompose the intergenerational elasticity of income
into a component explained be genetics and a component explained by the environmen-
tal impact of environmental correlates of parental income. It is easy to show that this
decomposes as follows:
γ = aγωA + p
genetic component environmental component
(3.11)
Recalling that the income of the child is a function of child characteristics
ωi,n = β
′zi,n.
the correlation of child and parent income is:
γ =E[ωi,n−1β
′zi,n−1]
=aγωA + pγωP + fγωF + eγωE
=aγωA + p
From the definition of Fi,n and Ei,n they are uncorrelated with parental income. While
from the definition of privilege Pi,n is perfectly correlated with parental income and so
γωP = 1.
We continue with the standard behavioural genetics assumption that the unique environ-
ment of one twin is uncorrelated with the genes of the other twin. Also recall that, by
definition, the unique environment of one twin is uncorrelated with both the unique en-
vironment and shared environment of the other twin. These assumptions and definitions
imply that moment conditions for the correlation between the outcome of the identical
twins, µ, and the outcome of the fraternal twins, δ are as follows:























































2δF + 2a(pιAP + fιAF ).
Finally, the moment condition for the variance of ω is:




=a2 + p2 + f2 + e2 + 2a {pE [Ai,nPi,n] + fE [Ai,nFi,n]}
=a2 + p2 + f2 + e2 + 2a(pιAP + fιAF ).
To identify the four parameters of interest, values for γωA, ιAP and ιAF are required. By
definition
γωA = ιAP .
ιAP can then be derived as a function of the four parameters of interest, b1 and ιAF :











The variance-covariance structure of parental characteristics which is:







0 0 0 1
 .
To proceed further we must reintroduce the behavioural genetics assumptions. For the rest
of this paper we will take Mendel’s first two laws and the assumption of random mating
in the behavioural genetics models as given. This implies that the first row, b′1, of the








Hence, under these assumptions ιAP is given as
ιAP = 0.5[a+ pιAP + fιAF ] (3.12)







i,n−1]b3 + Cov(εi,n, ξi,n).
Without values for b3 and Cov(εi,n, ξi,n) we cannot estimate ιAF . Boundaries can be put
on b3 from the fact that








These boundaries are, unfortunately, not very restrictive. There is also no estimate for
Cov(εi,n, ξi,n). However, bounds can still be placed on the parameters of interest, β, by
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estimating β for values of ιAF ∈ [−1, 1]. It shall be seen that the value of ιAF does not
have implications for the value of a but only for the values of p and f .
The final assumptions that will be borrowed from the ACE model are that the correlation
between the genes of identical twins is µA = 1 and between fraternal twins it is δA = 0.5.
This implies a particular structure on the variance-covariance matrix of εi,n. Particularly,























































Note that εi,n is orthogonal to Ai,n−1 and so the correlation between the genes of the parent
and child is








=0.5 Var(Ai,n−1) + E[Ai,n−1εi,n]
=0.5.
Under these relaxed behavioural genetics assumptions the moment conditions for µ, δ, γ
and Var(ωi,n) are:
µ =a2 + p2 + f2 + 2a (pιAP + fιAF ) , (3.13)
δ =0.5a2 + p2 + f2 + 2a (pιAP + fιAF ) , (3.14)
γ =aγωA + p, (3.15)
Var(ωi,n) = 1 =a
2 + p2 + f2 + e2 + 2a (pιAP + fιAF ) , (3.16)
where
ιAP = γωA = 0.5[a+ pιAP + fιAF ]. (3.17)
It is immediately obvious that the identification of a2 and e2 is unchanged from the standard
ACE model. From (3.13) and (3.14) we see that
a2 = 2 (µ− δ) (3.18)
and from (3.13) and (3.16) that
e2 = 1− µ. (3.19)
Before moving on to look at identification of p and f in the general case it is instructive
to look at identification in two simpler cases. First we examine the case where none of
the behavioural genetics assumptions are relaxed - the case where shared environment is
uncorrelated with genes, ιAC = 0. Second we examine the case where ιAF = 0. The
case where ιAF = 0 allows shared environment to be correlated with genes, ιAC 6= 0, by
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estimating ιAP in the case that residual family environment is uncorrelated with the genes
of the child.
Special Case: ιAC = 0





p =γ + δ − µ, (3.21)
f =
√





If ιAC = 0 then it follows that
pιAP + fιAF = cιAC = 0.
In which case equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.16) and (3.17) reduce to:
µ =a2 + p2 + f2, (3.24)
δ =0.5a2 + p2 + f2, (3.25)
Var(ωi,n) = 1 =a











a2 and e2 are identified by:
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a2 =2(µ− δ), (3.29)
e2 =1− µ. (3.30)
Substituting out a2 in (3.28) and rearranging gives an estimate of p:
p = γ + δ − µ. (3.31)
(3.24) and (3.25) imply:
2δ − µ = p2 + f2.
Using (3.31) to substitute out p gives the following estimate of f2:
f2 = 2δ − µ− (γ + δ − µ)2. (3.32)

Special Case: ιAF = 0
Proposition 3.2. If the correlation between residual family environment and genes is zero,




p =2 + γ −
√
(2− γ)2 + 4a2, (3.34)
f =
√










When ιAF = 0 equations (3.13), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) reduce to:
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µ =a2 + p2 + f2 + 2apιAP , (3.38)
δ =0.5a2 + p2 + f2 + 2apιAP , (3.39)
γ =aγωA + p, (3.40)
Var(ωi,n) = 1 =a
2 + p2 + f2 + e2 + 2apιAP , (3.41)
ιAP = γωA0.5(a+ pιAP ) (3.42)
a2 and e2 are identified by:
a2 =2(µ− δ), (3.43)
e2 =1− µ. (3.44)
Rearrange equation (3.40) for γωA




then substitute out ιAP in (3.42) and rearrange:
p2 − (2 + γ)p+ 2γ − a2 = 0.




(2− γ)2 + 4a2
2
.
Define the upper root as p̄ and the lower root as p. Note that
p̄ ≥ 2.
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Therefore the upper root is not feasible as it implies a correlation greater than one.
Hence
p = p =
2 + γ)−
√
(2− γ)2 + 4a2
2
.
Substituting out p and ιAP in equations (3.38) and (3.39) implies that




2δ − µ− [p2 + 2apιAP ].
f ≥ 0 therefore the upper root is the solution for f .

General Case: ιAF ≥ 0
There is no reason of course to assume that residual family environment is uncorrelated
with genes. We are able to identify the parameters of interest for any given value of ιAF .
However, we can only prove that we can uniquely identify these parameters for all cases
when the correlation between the child’s genes and residual family environment is weakly
positive (or when ιAC = 0 as shown in the special case above).
Proposition 3.3. p is uniquely identified for a set of primitives and f as follows:
p = W (f) ≡ f
2 + afιAF + 2γ − a2 − (2δ − µ)
2− γ
. (3.45)
f is any value of f ≥ 0 such that |ιAP | ≤ 1 and





b2 =2 [2γ − µ] + 2 [µ− δ] ι2AF + γ2 − 4,
b1 =2ιAF [4γ − µ− 4]
√
2(µ− δ),
b0 = [2γ − µ] [2γ [γ − 1]− µ] + [2δ − µ] [2− γ]2 .
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Proof:
f ≥ 0 by definition. ιAP is a correlation so |ιAP | ≤ 1.





Using (3.47) to substitute out ιAP in (3.17) and rearranging yields:
Qp(p) ≡ p2 − p(2 + γ) + 2γ − a2 − a fιAF = 0. (3.48)
From equations (3.13) and (3.14)
2δ − µ = p2 + f2 + 2a (pιAP + fιAF ) . (3.49)
Again using (3.47) to substitute out ιAP in (3.49) and rearranging
Qf (f) ≡ f2 + f2aιAF + p(2γ − p)− (2δ − µ) = 0. (3.50)
The sum of (3.50) and (3.48) is:
Qp(p) +Qf (f) = f
2 + afιAF − (2− γ)p+ 2γ − a2 − (2δ − µ) = 0 (3.51)
This can be rearranged to give p as a function of f :
p = W (f) ≡ f
2 + afιAF + 2γ − a2 − (2δ − µ)
2− γ
.
Which gives equation (3.45) in proposition 3.3. Substituting W (f) into Qf (f) implies that
f is the solution to
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(2− γ)2 − a2ι2AF + 2γ(2− γ)− 2
[





(2− γ)2 + γ(2− γ)−
[









2γ − a2 − (2δ − µ)
]]











0 = Φ(f) ≡ f4 + f3b3 + f2b2 + fb1 + b0.

This implies as many as four pairs of values for f and p that solve the model. However,
these roots must also satisfy the following two conditions:
f ≥0 (3.53)
|ιAP | = |γωA| ≤1 (3.54)
Condition (3.53) follows because f must be weakly positive as F is a latent variable defined
as positive only when it has a positive impact on the outcome ω. Condition (3.54) follows,
obviously, as ιAP = γωA is a correlation.
It can be shown that so long as the correlation between parental genes and the residual
family environment is weakly positive that a solution to (3.46) satisfying conditions (3.53)
and (3.54), when it exists, will be unique. As shown in proposition 3.4 below:
Proposition 3.4. If ιAF ≥ 0 there is at most one solution for p and f ≥ 0 where |ιAP | ≤ 1.
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Proof:














= 2f + 2aιAF + 2
dp
df
(γ − p) ≥ 0 where p ≤ γ. (3.56)
Using the quadratic formula to solve for p in (3.48) yields:
p =
2 + γ ±
√
(2− γ)2 + 4a(a+ fιAF )
2
. (3.57)
Call the upper root p̄ and the lower root p. It follows from f ≥ 0 and ιAF ≥ 0 that where
roots exist:
p̄ ≥ 2.





which contradicts the properties of a correlation. Hence, all feasible values of p are derived
from the lower root. It also follows from (3.57) that where roots exist:
p =
2 + γ −
√
(2− γ)2 + 4a(a+ fιAF )
2
≤ γ. (3.58)
As the only feasible values of p are less than equal to γ this implies that for feasible solutions






In which case, in the range of feasible solutions Phi(f) = 0 only once.

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3.4 Counterfactual Analysis
There are four hypothetical experiments that we might want to consider. The first experi-
ment is to equalise all privilege associated with parental income to the mean for generation
n such that Pi,n = 0 for all i. The second experiment is to equalise all privilege associated
with parental income to the mean for all generations such that Pi,n = 0 for all i and n. The
third experiment is to equalise the residual family environment to the mean for a single
generation n such that Fi,n = 0 for all i. The fourth experiment is to equalise the residual
family environment to the mean for all generations such that Fi,n = 0 for all i and n.
In order to do this experiment it is useful to have the unnormalised variances and covari-
ances. These are given below:
Var(ωi,n) =a
2 + p2 Var(Pi,n) + f
2 Var(Fi,n) + e
2







{aCov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) + pCov(ωi,n−1, Pi,n)} (3.61)











{a+ pCov(Ai,n−1, Pi,n−1) + f Cov(Ai,n−1, Fi,n−1)} (3.62)
Experiment 1: Equalise all privilege associated with parental income to the mean for
generation n such that Pi,n = 0 for all i. Under this counterfactual define the standard
deviation of ωi,n as σ
′
n and the intergenerational elasticity of income between generation
n− 1 and generation n as γ′n.
As the variance of Pi,n is now 0 from equation (3.60) it follows that the variance of income
for generation n (only) under this first counterfactual is:
(σ′n)
2 = a2 + f2 + e2 + 2afιAF . (3.63)
Equalisation of privilege occurs only for generation n so the variance of income for gener-
88 CHAPTER 3. PRIVILEGE AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
ation n − 1 is unchanged, σ′n−1 = 1. Moreover, while the covariance between the child’s
genes and environmental privilege falls to zero the covariance between the parents genes
and environmental privileges remains the same, ιAP . Consequently, the covariance between
parent’s income and child’s genes is unchanged:











{aCov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) + pCov(ωi,n−1, Pi,n)}
=
1√






The denominator in the first fraction is the counterfactual standard deviation of ωi,n mul-
tiplied by the counterfactual standard deviation of ωi,n−1. The second fraction, in braces,
is the expression we get for aCov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) from (3.64). While
pCov(ωi,n−1, Pi,n) = 0
as Var(Pi,n) = 0.
Experiment 2: Equalise all privilege associated with parental income to the mean for
all generations such that Pi,n = 0 for all i and n. Under this counterfactual define the
standard deviation of ωi,n as σ
′′
n and the intergenerational elasticity of income between
generation n− 1 and generation n as γ′′n.
Under this counterfactual the variance of ω for all generations becomes:
(σ′′n)
2 = a2 + f2 + e2 + 2afιAF for all n. (3.66)
As the equalisation of privilege occurs for all generations the covariance of parents’ genes





It then follows that the intergenerational elasticity of income under this counterfactual







{aCov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) + pCov(ωi,n−1, Pi,n)}
=
1






The denominator in the first fraction is the counterfactual standard deviation of ωi,n mul-
tiplied by the counterfactual standard deviation of ωi,n−1. The second fraction, in braces,
is the expression we get for aCov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) from (3.67). While again,
pCov(ωi,n−1, Pi,n) = 0
as Var(Pi,n) = 0.
Experiment 3: Equalise the residual family environment the mean for a single generation
n such that Fi,n = 0 for all i. Under this counterfactual define the standard deviation of
ωi,n as σ
∗
n and the intergenerational elasticity of income between generation n − 1 and
generation n as γ∗n.
As the variance of Fi,n is now 0 from equation (3.60) it follows that the variance of income
for generation n (only) under this first counterfactual is:
(σ∗n)
2 = a2 + p2 + e2 + 2apιAP . (3.69)
Residual family environment is unchanged in the parental generation and so the covariance
between the child of generation n’s genes and parental income (or equivalently privilege) is
unchanged. Hence, we can use ιAP /γAW as estimated prior to the counterfactual analysis.





Experiment 4: Equalise the residual family environment the mean for all generations
such that Fi,n = 0 for all i and n. Under this counterfactual define the standard deviation
of ωi,n as σ
∗∗
n and the intergenerational elasticity of income between generation n− 1 and
generation n as γ∗∗n .
Consider first that as Var(Fi,n) = 0 for all generations that Cov(Ai,n−1, Fi,n−1) = 0.
Hence:
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Cov(An, Pn) = Cov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) =
1
2
[a+ pCov(ωi,n−2, Ai,n−1)] . (3.71)
From the stationarity condition
Cov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) = Cov(ωi,n−2, Ai,n−1) for all n
and so
Cov(An, Pn) = Cov(ωi,n−1, Ai,n) =
a
2− p
for all n. (3.72)
This implies then that the counterfactual variance of income is
(σ∗∗n )
















3.5 An Application to Taubman (1976) and Lee and Solon
(2009)
Taubman (1976) uses American male twins born between 1917 and 1927 data from the
NAS-NRC twins who did military service during World War 2. Taubman’s study does
not, however, report intergenerational elasticities of income. The closest estimates for the
intergenerational elasticities of this cohort can be found in Lee and Solon (2009). In these
two papers the following elasticities between the incomes of identical twins, fraternal twins
and between fathers and sons are:
µ = 0.54, δ = 0.30, and γ = 0.34. (3.75)
From these results the estimates of a2 and e2 are:
â2 =2(µ− δ) = 0.48 (3.76)
ê2 =1− µ = 0.46 (3.77)
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Note, these estimates do not depend on the correlation of genes and residual shared environ-
ment, ιAF . However, the estimates of p, f and ιAP do depend on the value of ιAF . Estimates
of the parameters of interest are given for values of ιAF over the interval [0, 1].
5
Table 1: Parameter Estimates using twin data from Taubman (1976) and intergenerational
data from Lee and Solon (2009).
ιAF = 0 ιAF = 0.25 ιAF = 0.5 ιAF = 1
p 0.089 0.087 0.087 0.087
f 0.086 0.023 0.012 0.0061
ιAP 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.37
aιAP 0.251 0.253 0.253 0.253
The environmental impact of parental income and its correlates are quite insensitive to
variation in the correlation between the residual shared environment and genes. Likewise,
the correlation between parental income and the child’s genes is similarly insensitive to
variation in ιAF .
The first counterfactual experiment of increasing the environmental privileges associated
with paternal income by one percent is p. This is close to a one tenth of a percentage point
increase for all ιAF .
The second counterfactual experiment is to equalise, to the population mean, the environ-
mental privilege associated with paternal income:
Table 2: The effects of equalising environmental privilege associated with paternal in-
come.
ιAF = 0 ιAF = 0.25 ιAF = 0.5 ιAF = 1
Fall in Inequality 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Fall in IGE 0.1 0.098 0.098 0.098
Percentage Fall
in IGE 0.294 0.288 0.288 0.288
These results are also relatively invariant to ιAF . This should be unsurprising as the
effect of removing privilege on inequality and intergenerational mobility is determined by
p and ιAP . Inequality, as measured by income variance, falls by about 5 percent and the
intergenerational elasticity of income falls by close to 30%.
The third counterfactual experiment in which we are interested is the effect of equalising
the residual shared environment to the mean. It might be expected that the results of this
5The reported results are based on the third root of the quartic equation (??). All other roots imply
either a negative value for f or that |ιAP | > 1.
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experiment are more sensitive to ιAF as the effect of the residual family environment varies
greatly with ιAF , decreasing more than 10 fold when moving from ιAF = 0 to ιAF = 1.
In the case of moving someone in the distribution of residual common environment by one
percent the effect is between one tenth of a percent and 1 two hundredth of a percent.
Note that the effect drops quite quickly with ιAF , a move from ιAF = 0 to ιAF = 0.25
implies a four fold drop in the impact of the residual common environment.
However, despite the range in values for f , we get the following results:
Table 3: The effects of equalising residual family environment.
ιAF = 0 ιAF = 0.25 ιAF = 0.5 ιAF = 1
Fall in Inequality 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008
Fall in IGE 0 0.002 0.002 0.002
Percentage Fall
in IGE 0 0.006 0.006 0.006
As with the experiment of equalising privilege the effect of equalising the residual shared
environment to the mean varies little with ιAF . The impact on inequality is to reduce
inequality by a little less than one percent. Intergenerational elasticity of income falls by
as much as six tenths of a percent.
To the extent that inequality is caused by family environment this analysis suggests that
it is mostly due to those privileges associated with parental income. Likewise, the inter-
generational persistence of earnings, to the extent it is caused by family environment, is
caused by those privileges associated with parental income.
The difference in the impact of the two experiments are relatively constant in ιAF . However,
in general the extent to which the paternal income measure captures shared environment
varies greatly in ιAF . As the impact of residual common environment decreases with
ιAF this implies the proportion of the common environment explained by the privilege
associated with parental income increases. This can be seen below:
Table 4: The importance of paternal income in explaining family environment.
ιAF = 0 ιAF = 0.25 ιAF = 0.5 ιAF = 1
p2
p2 + f2
0.513 0.936 0.981 0.995
Paternal income captures at least fifty percent of common environment. Note, however,
for correlations greater than or equal to 0.25 paternal income captures more than ninety
percent of common environment.
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3.6 Conclusion
The methodology developed in this paper allows us use twin data in combination with data
on parents to answer the following questions:
1. How much of intergenerational mobility is due to the privileges associated with
parental income?
2. What is the effect of variation in the privileges associated with parental income on
inequality?
3. How much of family environment is explained by a measure of parental income?
To answer these questions this method requires a subset of the assumptions used within
classical twin studies. Note, that the ACE model approach does not give answers to any
of these questions.
In the speculative application of this methodology to existing data on American twins
and the intergenerational elasticity of income between fathers and sons I get the following
answers to these three questions: 1) About thirty percent of the intergenerational elasticity
of income is due to the privileges associated with parental income; 2) About 5 percent of
income variance is caused by privileges associated with parental income; and 3) Between
fifty and ninety nine per cent of family environment is explained by a measure of parental
income.
These results must, however, be treated with extreme scepticism as the estimate of in-
tergenerational elasticity is for children born in 1952 while the twin correlations are for
children born between 1917 and 1927. That the intergenerational elasticity may be too
high or too low is a source of bias for the estimate of p, f and ιAP . Similarly, the different
methods for collection of the two sources of data could lead to bias. The solution to this
problem, of course, is better data. The next logical step it to take this method to a data
set where there are measurements of both the twins and their parents.
As stated earlier there are also several issues with the the ACE model that are also prob-
lems for the method developed in this paper. First, there are several covariance restrictions
that are carried over from the ACE model. Second, the assumption of additive genetics.
This is an assumption that the interaction effects between an individuals genetic polymor-
phisms are negligible. There is some evidence to suggest that this issue is not particularly
problematic (Neale and Cardon, 1992) but the issue is far from settled. Third, and per-
haps most seriously, is the assumptions of additive separability and linearity. Heckman
(2007) citing Rutter (2006) criticises the notion that nature and nurture can be neatly
decomposed into two separate effects.
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This paper allows us to deal with one of these issues, the assumption of family environment
being uncorrelated with genes. More importantly the method in this paper allows us to
interpret the twin study results in a way that is meaningful for the growing debate over
inequality and intergenerational mobility. This said, there is clearly much still to be done
if we are to understand what data on twins really means for the causes of inequality and
intergenerational mobility.
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